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Glossary and list of abbreviations 
 
AML/CFT Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism 
ANBSC Agenzia Nazionale dei Beni Sequestrati e Confiscati alla 
criminalità organizzata 
Antimafia Code Codice delle leggi antimafia e delle misure di 
prevenzione, nonché nuove disposizioni in materia di 
documentazione antimafia, a norma degli articoli 1 e 2 
della legge 13 agosto 2010, n. 136 
BAS   Bank Secrecy Act 
CDD     Customer Due Diligence 
Chinese AML Law Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People’s Republic 
of China 
DNFBPS    Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
FATF     Financial Action Task Force 
FIU     Financial Intelligence Unit 
Italian AML Law Attuazione della direttiva 2005/60/CE concernente la 
prevenzione dell'utilizzo del sistema finanziario a scopo 
di riciclaggio dei proventi di attività criminose e di 
finanziamento del terrorismo nonché della direttiva 
2006/70/CE che ne reca misure di esecuzione 
NAS     Nuclei Antisofisticazioni e Sanità dei Carabinieri 
NPO     Non-profit organisation 
Palermo Convention United Nations convention against transnational 
organized crime 
PRC     People’s Republic of China 
RBA     Risk-based approach 
SAR     Special Administrative Region 
SAR     Suspicious Activity Report 
STR     Suspicious Transaction Report 
Terrorist Financing Convention International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism 
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UN     United Nations 
UNODC    United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes 
Vienna Convention United Nations convention against illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Money laundering may be seen as the answer to the following rhetorical question: “What is 
the point of committing an illicit activity, if I cannot enjoy its reward?”. Given its nature, the 
origin of the phenomenon can be traced back to the very beginning of commerce. Sterling 
Seagrave, a British historian, describes in his book “Lords of the Rim” how Chinese 
merchants used to hide, move and invest their wealth in remote provinces or even outside of 
China more than three thousand years ago. Although methodologies and techniques have 
indeed evolved over the last millennia, the basic idea of money laundering was already in 
place: make money obtained from illicit activities appears as though it was originated from a 
legitimate source. 
 
Estimations of global money laundering activities may be based either on macroeconomic 
approaches or microeconomic approaches, but they generally give a loose perception of the 
size of the phenomenon. Recent studies conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crimes (UNODC) have estimated money laundering to be around 2.7 per cent of global GDP. 
However, estimates are often the results of different definitions of money laundering and 
empirical analyses and, therefore, changes from one year to another cannot be used as a 
precise measure of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of legislations. 
Money laundering methods and techniques are constantly evolving. Different methods may be 
used in one or more of the three stages of money laundering (placement, integration and 
layering). These methods range from cash smuggling and international trade to gambling and 
the use of front businesses. Despite the variety of methods, however, money laundering is 
usually a cross-border activity. The aim of the first chapter of this dissertation is to introduce 
the phenomenon of money laundering and give a practical overview of some of the methods 
that are commonly used to launder money. 
 
Criminal organisations not only need to launder the proceeds of their illicit activities, but they 
also need to maintain their power and status. The aim of the second chapter of this 
dissertation is to describe the most common features of criminal companies and recent trends 
in the investments made by Italian criminal organisations in the legal economy. Furthermore, 
it is also worth describing what are the so-called “red flags” that may be used to identify 
possible criminal companies. 
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Considering the international framework in which money launderers operate, it is paramount 
to adopt a set of measures that are aimed at enhancing the cooperation between different 
States and international bodies. Examples of successful collaborations are the Vienna 
Convention of 1988, the Palermo Convention of 2000 – which entered into force in 2003 – 
and the Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on Money 
Laundering, initially developed in 1990 and recently revised. 
 
Terrorist financing is another topic worth considering. Money laundering and terrorist 
financing are linked by the need of secrecy: although funds used to finance terrorist groups 
may originate from both legitimate sources and criminal activities, the techniques used to 
launder money are similar to, if not the same as, those used to conceal the sources of terrorist 
financing. Consequently, Anti-Money Laundering (AML) international standard also include 
measures aimed at Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). For instance, the FATF 
Recommendations include a set of nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, 
which also deal with the vulnerabilities of non-profit organisations. States are, therefore, both 
required to comply with international regulations and encouraged to develop their own 
AML/CFT legislation. Italy is among the seven founding members of the FATF – which was 
founded in 1989 by the G-7 countries – and its AML/CFT legislation is considerably in 
compliance with the FATF Recommendations. The aim of the third chapter of this 
dissertation is to describe the major international AML/CFT regulations and standards and to 
describe Italy’s legislative framework, also in comparison with the Anti-Money Laundering 
Law of the People’s Republic of China. The comparison may be useful also in the light of the 
fact that China issued its own AML legislation in 2007, almost seventeen years after the 
constitution of the FATF. 
 
Criminal organisations have the necessity to conceal their identities and blur the audit trail of 
their operations. Although there are several ways to achieve this purpose, one easy method 
would be the use of equity investments. The aim of the fourth chapter of this dissertation is to 
provide empirical evidence on the use of equity investments by criminal companies. The 
research questions posed in this chapter are the following: do criminal companies hold more 
equity investments, either in Italy or abroad, with respect to comparable non-criminal 
companies? Is their average percentage of ownership higher or lower? What are the common 
elements, if any, of such equity investments? The analysis consists of a comparison between a 
sample of criminal companies and a control sample of non-criminal companies both located 
in the Piemonte region.  
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Chapter One 
Money laundering: definition and size of the phenomenon 
 
 
 
Money laundering may be defined as “the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that 
such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit 
origin of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the 
predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action”1. 
The origin of the term ‘money laundering’ is still a debatable matter. According to Jeffrey 
Robinson, who has been defined as “the world’s leading financial crime author” by the British 
Bankers’ Association, the term was first used in 1972 during the Watergate scandal. At that 
time, Miami investigator Martin Dardis, while describing Nixon’s fundraising scheme, which 
was run by his finance director Maurice Stans, used the term ‘laundering’ to define the 
process behind the creation of an untraceable money source. The Committee to Re-elect the 
President (CREEP) exploited this system to receive illegal contributions from corporations 
through a bank in Mexico City2. 
 
Since the 1980’s, the attention toward money laundering has increased dramatically. First 
drug trafficking and then terrorism have both been identified as the main driver behind the 
surge in money laundering activities, which in turn led to an increase in the number and scope 
of laws aimed at combating this phenomenon. Money laundering is, therefore, the conversion 
of money generated by criminal activities into assets whose source cannot be identified. This 
process is conventionally divided into three subsequent phases: “placement” of the proceeds 
of an illegal activity into the financial system; “layering” of the funds by separating them 
from their illegal source through a series of complex operations; “integration” of the funds 
into the economy, by combining them with money generated by legitimate sources. 
 
Placement is the phase in which money launderers are most vulnerable, because it involves 
the movement of large amounts of cash. This can be achieved through a number of 
techniques, such as the creation of several bank accounts into one or more financial 
                                                     
1 Palermo Convention, article 6.1(a)(i) 
2 Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward, All the President’s Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), 54-56. 
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institutions3 in which small amounts of cash below the threshold that triggers controls by the 
authorities are deposited (a process known as “smurfing”). Other methods may involve bulk 
cash smuggling, gambling and front businesses. Layering is essential to blur the audit trail of 
the proceeds and may involve the movement of the funds out of the country through many 
different institutions and jurisdictions. At this stage, the funds can be used to purchase other 
securities and negotiable instruments or transferred to shell corporations and tax havens. 
Integration is the last stage of the money laundering scheme, and involves the combination of 
the laundered funds with the proceeds of normal financial or commercial activities. At this 
point, the funds can be freely used in any way, including the reinvestment in the original 
criminal company and the financing of terrorist groups. 
 
By its very nature, it is not possible to measure money laundering activities. The only 
available actual data are those related to investigations and confiscations by law enforcement. 
However, several organisations have tried to estimate the size of the phenomenon. In 1998, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the scale of global money laundering 
operations within a “consensus range” between 2-5 per cent of global GDP4. In 2009, 
according to the key findings of the UNODC, global money laundering was estimated to be 
2.7 per cent of global GDP, still within IMF’s range5. These results have been obtained 
through an estimation that consists of three main sub-components, namely the calculation of 
the financial gains arising from transnational crime activities, the estimation of the amounts 
that enter the financial system, and the estimation of the amounts that cross borders for money 
laundering purposes6. Furthermore, the results suggest that the “interception rate” over the 
proceeds of crime laundered through the financial system is around 0.2 per cent7, meaning 
that a lot remains to be done in terms of AML legislation and investigations. 
Since these estimates are the results of different definitions and techniques used to measure 
money laundering, changes in the size of the phenomenon from one year to another cannot be 
used to judge the effectiveness of the AML regime. Generally, money laundering estimation 
methods consist of either a macroeconomic or microeconomic approach. The former produces 
                                                     
3 Paul Alan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 
(Washington: IBRD, 2006), 7. 
4 IMF. “Money Laundering: The Importance of International Countermeasures,” February 10, 1998, accessed 
July 6, 2016, https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/021098.htm. 
5 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Estimating illicit financial flows resulting from drug trafficking 
and other transnational organized crimes,” (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), 7. 
6 Ibid, 9. 
7 Ibid, 7. 
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an upper bound of how much money may be laundered through an estimation of the hidden 
economy, which is obtained by comparing the actual cash holdings and the expected cash 
holdings – with respect to tax rates, wages, interest rates and real per capita income – over a 
period of time8. The microeconomic approach produces a lower bound on the demand for 
money laundering services through the estimation of the income generated by different 
criminal activities9. These two approaches, even when used together, produce loose 
estimations of how much money is laundered, and therefore could not be reasonably expected 
to provide guidance for policy makers. 
 
1.1 Methods and techniques 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the following definitions adopted by the FATF apply: a 
“method” is a particular procedure for carrying out money laundering activity, while a 
“technique” is a particular action or way that the activity is carried out.  
Money laundering methods and techniques have indeed changed and evolved throughout the 
years. In order to provide a practical framework, three methods commonly used by money 
launderers are presented in the following pages: cash smuggling, front businesses and shell 
companies, and trade-based money laundering. 
 
1.1.1 Cash smuggling 
 
Cash smuggling is one of the oldest money laundering placement methods and consists of the 
bulk shipments of cash across borders. This process, according to UK Law enforcement, can 
be summarised as raising, moving, storing and using cash. Raising the funds is obviously the 
first stage, which consists in the generation of the criminal proceeds through illicit activities; 
moving the cash is necessary to avoid regulatory oversight, separate the proceeds from the 
predicate offence and break the audit trail; storing the ill-gotten proceeds refers to physically 
keeping the money in a safe location; finally, the proceeds can be used both for licit and for 
illicit activities.  
 
Cash smuggling is not illegal per se, and therefore there are thresholds that permit the 
functioning of the system as a whole. FATF Recommendation 32 requires “all persons 
making a physical transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments, which are of 
                                                     
8 Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering 
(Washington: Peterson Institute, 2004), 11. 
9 Ibid, 19. 
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a value exceeding a pre-set, maximum threshold of USD/EUR 15,000, to submit a truthful 
declaration to the designated competent authorities”, which is the so-called “declaration 
system”. On the other hand, countries may adopt a “disclosure system” whereby “travellers 
are required to provide the authorities with appropriate information upon request”.  
 
In Italy, according to articles 3 and 9 of the decreto legislativo 19 novembre 2008, n. 195, the 
threshold is set at EUR 10,000. Transporting an amount of monetary instruments (including 
cash, traveller’s cheques, negotiable instruments and securities in bearer form) that exceeds 
this threshold requires a notification to the Italian Customs Agency. Failing to make the 
notification is punishable with a fine that can be at maximum 40 per cent of the amount that 
exceeds the threshold, with a minimum of EUR 300.   
In the U.S., Bulk Cash Smuggling is a reporting offence under the Bank Secrecy Act (BAS), 
which provides a threshold of USD 10,000 and penalties that include imprisonment for not 
more than five years and forfeiture of any property involved in the offence10. 
China’s legislation on cash smuggling is different from those implemented in Italy and U.S., 
as it is part of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), which is a mechanism 
aimed at controlling the amount of money coming into and out of the country and combating 
massive capital outflows. Although Chinese authorities limit the amount of money individuals 
can move out of the country to USD 50,000 per year11, data suggest that Chinese still manage 
to move out of the country huge volumes of cash12. Two of the most common methods that 
are used to avoid this restriction are quota pooling (smurfing) and underground banks: the 
former is the combination of several individual quotas, usually those available to family or 
friends; the latter is a two-step process in which a Chinese citizen opens a bank account in 
Hong Kong and then goes to a foreign-exchange shop, which provides a bank account to 
make a domestic transfer from his Chinese bank account. When this transaction is confirmed, 
the foreign-exchange shop transfers the amount of money (minus a fee) into the Chinese 
citizen’s Hong Kong account.  
Despite the increase in the use of non-cash payment methods, both legit and criminal 
economies are still heavily cash based13. Given the nature of the problem, there are no official 
                                                     
10 Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S. Code § 5332, Bulk cash smuggling into or out of the United States. 
11 Circular of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Printing and Distributing the Detailed Rules on 
the Implementation of the Measures for the Administration of Individual Foreign Exchange, art. 2. 
12 Bloomberg, “China’s Money Exodus,” November 3, 2015, accessed June 15, 2016, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-11-02/china-s-money-exodus. 
13 Europol Financial Intelligence Group, “Why is cash still king? A strategic report on the use of cash by 
criminal groups as a facilitator for money laundering,” (The Hague: Europol, 2015), 8. 
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estimates about the amount of cash physically smuggled each year. However, the reasons 
behind the importance of cash as a money laundering facilitator are rather clear. On the one 
hand, there are criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, that generate huge amounts of 
cash which, at some point, need to be laundered; on the other hand, cash offers anonymity and 
is untraceable. A combination of factors, including an increase in the scope and intensity of 
banking controls and an increase in criminal activity, are believed to be among the causes 
behind the recent surge in cash smuggling activity14. 
 
Illegal bulk cash smuggling requires indeed a certain degree of creativity, given that local law 
enforcement authorities – usually Customs Services – are trained to detect and record suspect 
cash movements. Cash smuggled by air can be concealed through body packing, in checked 
and hand luggage, or even swollen – in a similar fashion to what drugs mules do to transport 
drugs – to reduce its visibility on scanners. Couriers travelling by road, instead, can hide huge 
amounts of cash by modifying the chassis, seats or other parts of vehicles. For instance, in 
June 2016 the Italian Guardia di Finanza stopped a Chinese citizen on the Udine-Tarvisio 
highway for a routine inspection, just to discover he was smuggling EUR 670,000 cash in a 
homemade compartment under the seats of his car15. In order to increase the efficiency of 
cash smuggling activities, it is fundamental to reduce the volume, but not the value, of the 
cash transported. This is the reason behind the important role played by high denomination 
notes, in particular the EUR 500 note. To provide an intuitive, yet exhaustive example, it is 
sufficient to think that EUR 1 million in EUR 500 notes weighs 2.2kg, while the same amount 
of cash in EUR 50 notes weighs 22kg and takes up a tenfold larger space. As of April 2016, 
EUR 500 notes represent 27 per cent of the total value of notes in circulation, even though 
they represent just 3 per cent of the total volume16. On May 4 2016 ECB decided to 
discontinue the production and issuance of EUR 500 notes, with the aim of fighting money 
laundering and illicit activities. The decision will be effective around the end of 2018, but 
EUR 500 notes will remain legal tender and will continue to be used as a mean of payment or 
exchanged at the national central banks17. 
                                                     
14 FATF, “Money Laundering through the Physical Transportation of Cash,” (Paris: FATF, 2015), 29. 
15 Messaggero Veneto, “Cinese trovato dalla Gdf in autostrada con 670 mila euro in contanti,” June 24, 2016, 
accessed June 27, 2016, http://messaggeroveneto.gelocal.it/udine/cronaca/2016/06/25/news/cinese-trovato-dalla-
gdf-in-autostrada-con-670-mila-euro-in-contanti-1.13720499. 
16 ECB. “Banknotes and coins circulation,” accessed June 16, 2016, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/euro/circulation/html/index.en.html. 
17 ECB. “ECB ends production and issuance of EUR 500 banknote,” accessed June 27, 2016, 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2016/html/pr160504.en.html. 
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There are indeed certain trends that can be spotted, as regards cash smuggling. Most cross 
border cash smuggling activities are detected at airports, where controls and passenger checks 
are more effective. but road and rail are also common transportation means within the EU, 
especially to and from Switzerland18. According to Gabriel Zucman, professor at the London 
School of Economics, as of October 2013 Italian citizens had moved EUR 120 billion to 
Switzerland, 80 per cent of which was generated by illicit activities and tax evasion19. Italian 
and Swiss governments have since then begun to cooperate, with the aim of abolishing bank 
secrecy and enhance the exchange of information between the two countries. On 4 December 
2014 the Italian parliament has also approved the Voluntary Tax Disclosure Program, which 
can be used by taxpayers to declare previously undisclosed assets and funds, independent of 
whether they are owned abroad or in Italy. Taxpayers who comply with the program are 
required to pay 100 per cent of the taxes due and will not remain anonymous, but will benefit 
from a reduction in penalties20.  
 
Fighting cash smuggling is definitely a hard task. The rationale behind the adoption of 
thresholds to limit the amount of cash that can be moved freely across borders is 
straightforward: an individual who carries large amounts of cash must be able to explain both 
its source and its purpose, given that there are easier – and legitimate – ways to transfer 
money. As far as controls are concerned, law enforcement has to deal with several inherent 
limitations. Passenger and luggage checks cannot be put in place effectively on rail and road, 
and even at airports they are not always sufficient to detect cash. Once cash has been detected, 
local authorities may still encounter some complications, as it is not in itself an illicit 
commodity, differently from drugs and counterfeit goods. Therefore, confiscation is often 
limited to the amount of cash that exceeds the threshold and further investigations can rarely 
connect the money to the predicate offence that generated it.  
 
                                                     
18 Europol Financial Intelligence Group, “Why is cash still king? A strategic report on the use of cash by 
criminal groups as a facilitator for money laundering,” (The Hague: Europol, 2015), 23. 
19 Angelo Mincuzzi, “Il Tesoro degli italiani in Svizzera? Nel 2013 erano almeno 120 miliardi di euro,” Il Sole 
24 Ore, November 14, 2013, accessed June 27, 2016, http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2013-11-13/il-
tesoro-italiani-svizzera-2013-erano-almeno-120-miliardi-euro-195518.shtml?uuid=ABb7U0c. 
20 EY. “Italian Parliament approves Voluntary Disclosure Program,” accessed June 28, 2016. 
http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/Human-Capital/HC-Alert--Italian-Parliament-approves-Voluntary-
Disclosure-Program. 
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Given that cash smuggling is typically a cross-borders phenomenon, cooperation between 
countries is fundamental, as pointed out in Recommendation 32. However, there are still a 
number of obstacles to be solved. Cash declaration regimes are not homogeneous, as there are 
differences in the thresholds, ability of law enforcement to intervene, and in the information 
exchange system. Since the success of cash smuggling – and money laundering – 
investigations depends on information regarding cross-border cash movements, Suspicious 
Transaction/Activity Reports (STRs/SARs) and ongoing investigations, it is clear that a 
harmonisation of the legislations on a global scale is required. 
 
1.1.2 Front businesses and shell companies 
 
Another common method used by criminal organisations to launder funds and place them into 
circulation is to run front businesses. A front business is a cash-intensive activity, that is to 
say it generates the majority of its profits in cash, and tends to employ few people, to reduce 
the risk of exposure. Activities that satisfy these two requisites include bars, restaurants, 
nightclubs, car washes, laundries and pawn shops. These activities offer the added advantage 
of generating a legitimate stream of profits, which enables money launderers to mix illegal 
funds with legal funds – a practice known as “blending” or “commingling” – so as to blur 
audit trails. Money generated by illicit sources are added either physically or metaphorically 
to the cash register. This operation entails two consequences, which are related to each other 
and must be taken into account. First, taxes must be paid on the income generated by adding 
the illegal funds to the legitimate revenues. Second, costs have to be adjusted accordingly – 
also through false and manipulated invoices – in order not to arouse suspicion, reducing 
therefore the actual tax expense. Moreover, some of the activities, such as nightclubs, offer an 
ideal marketplace to conduct also illegal activities, namely drug trafficking and prostitution, 
and may even serve as headquarters.  
 
In order to reduce the risk of getting caught, money launderers may take further measures, 
such as setting up front businesses in offshore jurisdictions (e.g. Cayman Islands, Panama, 
Bahamas, etc.), managing the businesses at arm’s length through associates and accomplices, 
and employing complicit accountants and other service providers.  
Regardless of the measures taken, audit procedures may uncover front businesses by focusing 
on certain “red flags”. Sales revenue, for instance, are monitored through a number of 
assertions, such as occurrence and accuracy: if subsequent bank deposits are too high with 
respect to plausible sales, also in relation to purchase orders, there may be a signal of money 
14 
 
laundering activities. These red flags are described more deeply in the second chapter of this 
dissertation. 
 
Shell companies are not necessarily an instrument to launder money, but their characteristics 
made them become a common tool for money laundering and other financial crimes.  Shell 
companies typically have no presence, active business operations or significant assets, which 
is the reason behind their name – they look good from the outside, but they are hollow inside. 
Shell companies can serve several legitimate purposes, such as to hold stock or intangible 
assets of another business entity or to facilitate domestic and cross-border corporate mergers. 
However, they can also serve other purposes, whose legitimacy may be debatable, to say the 
least. One example of such purposes is Apple Inc.’s tax strategy, the so-called “Double Irish 
with a Dutch sandwich” system. This tax avoidance technique involves two Irish companies, 
a Dutch company and an offshore company located in a tax haven and is aimed at reducing 
taxes by routing profits through different jurisdictions.  
 
Apple Inc. owns an Irish subsidiary named Apple International Operations (AIO), a shell 
company based in Cork, Ireland where the company has no physical presence21. AIO owns all 
of Apple’s patents, trademarks, copyrights and licenses. Consequently, Apple Inc. must pay a 
fee to AIO for the right to sell its own products, which represents a business expense for the 
parent company. The U.S. profits and taxes are drastically lowered by this operation, but this 
is just one side of the coin. Due to a loophole in the Irish tax law, if the Irish subsidiary is 
controlled by managers outside Ireland, then the profits can be moved overseas tax-free to the 
company located in the tax haven. The second Irish company is used for sales in other 
countries, such as in the European market. Because of the Irish tax treaty with the 
Netherlands, profits can be transferred tax free to the Dutch subsidiary, which in turn can 
transfer profits tax free back to the first Irish company, whose earnings are eventually moved 
to the tax haven. This loophole was closed by the Irish finance minister in 2015 and 
companies with established schemes will continue to benefit from the old system until 202022. 
                                                     
21 Myriam Robin, “Behind Apple’s tax dodge: How the company avoids $US17 million in taxes every day,” 
SmartCompany, May 22, 2013, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.smartcompany.com.au/finance/tax/31829-
behind-apple-s-tax-dodge-how-the-company-avoids-us17-million-in-taxes-every-day/.  
22 Investopedia. “Double Irish With A Dutch Sandwich,” accessed July 8, 2016, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/double-irish-with-a-dutch-sandwich.asp.  
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Through the systematic use of shell companies, Apple allegedly moved a record USD 50 
billion offshore in 2014, where the company paid an effective tax rate of about 2.2 per cent23.  
 
Shell companies may also be used in the layering phase of money laundering schemes thanks 
to their very nature. They can be set up in offshore tax havens and used to open bank accounts 
and move money through wire transfers or other methods without disclosing the real identity 
of the owners. Another characteristic of shell entities that attracts money launderers is the 
simplicity of the set up process, that can take as little as a few hours24. In 2016, more than 11 
million files from the database of the world’s fourth biggest offshore law firm, Mossack 
Fonseca, were leaked. The Panama-based law firm, which was established in 1977 and 
employs more than 500 staff members, offers research and services – including the 
incorporation of companies – in many jurisdictions, such as The Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands and Panama. The leaked documents revealed 
the names and identities of 214,000 companies and 14,000 clients, including twelve national 
leaders25. The identities of the real owners and the sources of the money flowing offshore, 
however, are hard to discover because these companies are usually owned by nominees.  
 
1.1.3 Trade-based money laundering 
 
The FATF first tackled trade-based money laundering in 2006, when it published its report on 
the potential abuse of the international trade system by money launderers26. According to the 
report, the use of false documentation and declaration of traded goods and services is one of 
the three main methods used by money launderers, with the other two methods being cash 
smuggling, discussed in the last section, and the movement of value through the financial 
system. In general, the international trade system may attract money launderers because of its 
risks and vulnerabilities, which are associated with the large volume of trade flows, foreign 
exchange transactions and complex financing arrangements, the commingling of illicit funds 
with the cash flows generated by the legitimate front businesses and customs agencies’ scarce 
                                                     
23 Matt Gardner, “Apple Shifts a Record $50 Billion Overseas, Admits It Has Paid Miniscule to No Tax on 
Offshore Cash,” Tax Justice Blog, November 2, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, 
http://www.taxjusticeblog.org/archive/2015/11/apple_shifts_a_record_50_billi.php#.VngBmRUrKUk.  
24 Marina Kinner and Leonard W. Vona, Shell Companies, 2. 
25 Juliette Garside, Holly Watt and David Pegg, “The Panama Papers: how the world’s rich and famous hide 
their money offshore,” The Guardian, April 3, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/the-panama-papers-how-the-worlds-rich-and-famous-hide-
their-money-offshore.  
26 FATF, “Trade Based Money Laundering,” (Paris: FATF, 2006), 1. 
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availability of resources. The FATF has identified two main techniques used to launder 
money through international trade, which are invoice scams and black market peso exchange 
arrangements. 
 
Invoice scams 
 
Invoices can be manipulated so as to realise major benefits, including tax avoidance and 
money laundering. One technique identified by the FATF consists in the over- and under-
invoicing of goods and services. This technique is based on the misrepresentation of the price 
of the good or service delivered to transfer a higher value. If the price invoiced is higher than 
the fair market price, the exporter receives value from the importer, whereas if the price 
invoiced is lower than the fair market price, the exporter transfers value to the importer. Over- 
and under-invoicing of goods and services have also significant effects on taxation. In order 
to provide an exhaustive example27, consider a money launderer who buys a diamond whose 
price is EUR 5,000 by paying an invoiced amount of EUR 2,510 – just EUR 10 over its 
original cost of EUR 2,500 – and by paying EUR 2,490 in black. This is a win-win situation, 
because the seller will pay taxes on just EUR 10 and the money launderer has effectively 
placed EUR 2,490. Misrepresentation may involve also the quality or type of goods and 
services. For instance, an exporter may ship a relatively inexpensive good and invoice it as a 
more expensive one. Misrepresentation of quality and type is even easier in the trade in 
services, such as consulting services whose fair market values are always subject to valuation 
difficulties. 
 
Black market exchange peso arrangements 
 
Black market peso exchange arrangements were commonly used by the Colombian drug 
cartels so as to launder the proceeds of drug trafficking. This money laundering scheme 
became the subject of several studies in the 1980’s, as it provides an illustration of how 
different techniques can be combined into a single operation. The idea behind these 
arrangements is to swap dollars owned by the cartels in the United States for pesos already in 
Colombia. In order to do so, the cartels sell US dollars to a peso broker for Colombian pesos, 
usually at a discount. The peso broker smurfs the US currency into the US banking system 
and acts as an intermediary between Colombian importers, who need US dollars, and US 
                                                     
27 John Madinger, Money Laundering: A Guide for Criminal Investigators, Third Edition (Boca Raton: CRC 
Press, 2011), 260. 
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exporters. Despite their name, these arrangements are commonly used in many other 
countries. 
 
Combating trade-based money laundering is indeed a complex task. First, it is difficult to 
discern trade-based money laundering from legitimate international trade. Second, these 
schemes make use both of the trade sector and of the finance sector and can take multiple 
forms. As with other money laundering schemes and methods, international cooperation is 
key, but is difficult to achieve. According to a report issued by the Asia/Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering in 2012, more than 50 per cent of jurisdictions involved in trade-based 
money laundering investigations sought information from foreign jurisdictions28. However, 
the formal channels arranged for exchange of information that are usually deployed for 
combating trade-based money laundering, such as the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
(MLAT) and the Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA), often produce poor results 
due to delayed responses, inadequateness of information and limited feedback29. In the light 
of these considerations and given the complexity of the phenomenon, the development of 
specific formal channels aimed at enhancing international cooperation against trade-based 
money laundering may represent a turning point, rather than deploying means of cooperation 
that are also used for any other criminal investigation (MLAT) or customs fraud (CMAA). 
 
1.2 Recent trends in money laundering 
 
In order to better understand the money laundering phenomenon and its extent and to obtain a 
more detailed framework, it is worth mentioning other methods that may be used to launder 
money. In the following pages, three trends of money laundering through particular sectors 
are shortly discussed, according to the most recent annual reports of the FATF. These trends 
involve casinos and gambling, the real-estate sector, and legal professionals and accountants. 
 
1.2.1 Casinos and gambling 
 
Casinos and gambling, like financial institutions, may be used to place illicit funds into 
circulation. Casinos are made vulnerable to money laundering by the variety, frequency and 
volume of transactions that are within the scope of services provided throughout their activity. 
                                                     
28 Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, “APG Typology Report on Trade Based Money Laundering,” 
(Bangkok: APG, 2012), 73. 
29 Ibid, 76. 
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Although casinos are non-financial institutions, they offer a variety of financial services that 
are similar to those offered by banks, such as accepting funds on account, money exchange, 
and foreign currency exchange. These services are often offered at all times and involve the 
movement of large amounts of cash. Money typically follows a 3-step cycle that begins with 
the “buy in” phase, in which the customer buys the gaming instrument by cash or other means 
of payment. The second stage involves the use of the gaming instrument to play. Eventually, 
the gaming instrument is exchanged for cash or other means of payment in the “cash out” 
phase. Given these factors, money launderers may be attracted by casinos as a catalyst to their 
illicit activities. Casino managers are required to know the different techniques that may be 
used and recognise plausible signals of suspiciousness related to the behaviour of customers. 
These techniques and signals are outlined in the following pages, according to the FATF 
report on the vulnerabilities of casinos and gaming sector30 that adopts the following 
classification: 
 use of casinos value instruments; 
 structuring of transactions; 
 refining of banknotes; 
 use of individual accounts and safe deposit boxes; 
 conspiracy for fixed game. 
 
Use of casinos value instruments 
 
Casinos use value instruments, in particular chips and machine credits, to facilitate gambling 
and gaming activities. The value instruments may be bought with cash or on account and 
repayment is then requested by cheque or any other traceable method of payment. During this 
period of time, gaming activities may or may not occur. The audit trail may be further blurred 
by transferring the value instrument to another jurisdiction in which the casino chain has a 
branch, where the credit is then converted into a cheque or bank draft. 
Money launderers may also purchase value instruments from other casino customers who are 
not directly or indirectly associated to them, at a price higher than the face value of the chips 
so as to make the deal beneficial for both parties. Moreover, chips, casino gift certificates or 
casino reward may also be used as currency in illegal – even cross-borders – transactions, 
with the considerable advantage of not being subject to the limitations applicable to the use 
and movement of cash (i.e. FATF Recommendation 32). Casinos employees and managers 
shall pay attention to certain signals that may point out to the existence of money laundering 
                                                     
30 FATF, “Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector,” (Paris: FATF, 2009), 28. 
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schemes through the use of casino value instruments, such as the purchase of casino chips and 
the immediate claiming of those funds with little or no gaming activity, also in relation to the 
customer’s financial situation and profile, or the clear absence of the intention to win.  
 
Structuring of transactions 
 
Structuring of transactions requires the distribution of a large amount of money into several 
smaller transactions under the threshold that triggers reporting requirements, which is a 
practice known as smurfing. This technique may involve regular deposits of cash with value 
below the threshold, the use of third parties to undertake several smaller transactions, and the 
switch of gaming tables, gaming rooms or even casinos when the wagering amounts are 
approaching the threshold. Money launderers may also request the division of winnings into 
cash and chips payments that are below the threshold. 
 
Refining of banknotes 
 
Refining of banknotes is the practice of exchanging large amounts of low denomination 
banknotes for high denomination ones, for the reasons that have already been explained in 
chapter 1.1.1. Banknotes may be refined at the cashier’s desk, through gaming machines that 
accept cash or through the use of individual casino accounts. Possible indicators of money 
laundering schemes are usually connected to the customer’s profile and gaming activity, also 
with respect to the reporting threshold.  
 
Use of individual accounts and safe deposit boxes 
 
Casinos, as already seen, offer a variety of services that are similar to those offered by 
financial institutions, with less scrutiny and requirements. Customers have the possibility to 
open deposit accounts and lines of credits, or even use safe deposit boxes, with the latter 
service being usually offered to VIP, “high roller”, customers. Money launderers may exploit 
these services by depositing on their casino account cash and various types of cheques, with 
the subsequent possibility to use the balance of the account, or by using the funds on their 
casino accounts held in a jurisdiction to purchase casino value instruments in another 
jurisdiction. Safety deposit boxes held with casinos are often not regulated and, therefore, 
may also be used by third parties with a total lack of transparency. 
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Conspiracy for fixed games 
 
All the techniques illustrated so far do not require money launderers to do any gaming 
activity, even though failing to do so may jeopardise their schemes. Fixed games are used to 
attain a desirable outcome of the game, and usually require two or more persons. The most 
common technique in this sense is to play a fixed game with another associate, in which 
players place opposite equivalent bets on even money wagers in the same game. For example, 
Person A places EUR 1,000 on red, while Person B places EUR 1,000 on black in a game of 
roulette. Since the pay-out of this bet is 1:1, the winning party would win EUR 2,000, while 
the other party would lose EUR 1,000. In this way, every loss for A is a win for B, and vice 
versa, and the amount of money won is originated from a legitimate source. 
 
Two particular trends that are worth mentioning are online gambling and casino-based 
tourism, also known as “casino junkets”. Online gambling is a fast growing industry that, as 
of 2014, was expected to get close to EUR 31.2 billion in 2015, with a compound annual 
growth rate of about 7.3 per cent31. The online gambling industry includes different services, 
such as sports betting, online bingo, online lottery, online poker and casino games. Although 
the majority of the revenues come from sports betting, online poker and casinos are the fastest 
growing source of revenue and offer opportunities for money laundering32.  
Online casinos do not offer the same experience as traditional brick and mortar casinos, but 
they do indeed offer other valuable comforts, such as the possibility to play from home at 
every hour of the day. Another important advantage offered by online casinos regards 
privacy, because customers may have a disincentive to frequent local casinos if there is the 
possibility to get spotted by relatives, friends or acquaintances.  
 
Online casinos are indeed a cross-border activity: operators need a jurisdictional license to 
conduct activities, but servers may be located in another jurisdiction, while the company’s 
headquarters may be located in yet another jurisdiction. As a result, there may be legal gaps 
that criminals may exploit to conduct their money laundering activities. Licensed online 
casinos fall within the scope of national AML legislations and must therefore report 
customers’ information, including bank account information, to law enforcement through 
                                                     
31 Charles McFarland, François Paget and Raj Samani, “Jackpot! Money Laundering Through Online 
Gambling,” (Santa Clara: McAfee Labs, 2014), 4. 
32 Ibid., 6. 
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Customer Due Diligence (CDD)33. Restrictions and limitations on online casinos are 
connected to the amount of money that can be gambled, the time that can be spent gambling, 
and the number of accounts that can be opened by a player (usually one per player). Licensed 
online casinos are also required to accept payments only from licensed financial institutions, 
while unlicensed online casinos do not require customers to deposit funds through authorised 
financial institutions. In the light of these factors, online gambling through regulated casinos 
is not likely to be the preferred method for money launderers, who may therefore exploit 
unlicensed online casinos and take advantage of the alleged anonymity they grant their 
customers, also through the use of bitcoins34 and the TOR35 network. However, the actual 
implementation of the Bitcoin technology does not guarantee true anonymity: the flow of 
Bitcoin transactions is logged in a public register with random codes, which may still be 
traced back to the actual identity of the user through network analysis. Furthermore, online 
casinos operating through the TOR network will never be as popular as those on the 
traditional web, because of the inherent limitations due to the complexity of the network itself 
and the risk of getting scammed. 
 
Casino-based tourism, or casino junkets, consists of organised programs for people who travel 
to the casino primarily to gamble. These tours may be part of casinos’ marketing plans or may 
be run by independent operators, such as travel agents whose role is to bring players and 
funds to the casinos. Since these travels involve the movement of large amounts of money 
from one jurisdiction to another and may even involve the pooling of funds, they create a 
layer which may blur the identity of the players and the source of funds, attracting therefore 
money launderers. In particular, VIP customers or “high roller”, which are highly valued 
casino customers, pose a serious risk given that there is often a lack of specific regulations on 
VIP rooms, which in turn generate most of casino revenues. 
 
The Chinese Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Macau is China’s only legal casino 
hub. The SAR’s casino and hospitality sector generated revenue of USD45 billion in 2013, 
                                                     
33 MoneyVAL, “The use of online gambling for money laundering and the financing of terrorism purposes,” 
(Strasbourg: MoneyVAL, 2009), 7. 
34 Bitcoin is a digital peer-to-peer currency. From a user perspective, Bitcoin is a digital wallet that can be used 
to make payments over the Internet and even in a growing number of brick and mortar businesses. Payments are 
made from a wallet application by entering the recipient’s address and the amount. Transactions are recorded in 
a public register called “block chain”. At the time of writing, 1 bitcoin trades at about 601 Euros. 
35 TOR (The Onion Router) is a free software and an open network that defends users against traffic analysis 
through anonymity, by bouncing communications around a distributed network of relays run by other users all 
around the world. 
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almost sevenfold the revenues generated by Las Vegas in the same year36, accounting for 
more than half of Macau’s GDP37. A significant number of junkets promoters – more than 
two hundred in 201338 – operate in the SAR in order to assist customers in the movement of 
funds from mainland China to Macau casinos. As a consequence, money launderers may use 
this channel to circumvent PRC’s restrictions on movements of capital by depositing funds 
with junkets in the mainland and then gambling in Macau, eventually cashing out their 
winnings in foreign currency and investing in properties. Moreover, the fact that a number of 
foreign casinos and resort companies operate in Macau – such as the American Las Vegas 
Sands Corporation, which owns the largest casino in the SAR, The Venetian Macao, and 
Wynn Resorts Limited, which owns the Wynn Macau casino – poses a threat that must be 
tackled on a global scale. Chinese Special Administrative Regions are authorised by Article 
31 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as part of the “one country, 
two systems” principle formulated by the former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. As such, 
Macau has autonomy over all affairs except those related to diplomatic relations and national 
defence and will maintain its status until 2049, that is fifty years after its reversion to Chinese 
possession from colony of Portugal. According to Macau’s Law No. 2/2006 on money 
laundering, casinos and promoters of games of chance are subject to duties related to the 
identification of customers and operations, record-keeping and communication to the 
authorities whenever an activity might provide indicia of money laundering schemes or might 
involve substantial amounts of money. The threshold is set in the Instructions No. 2/2006 at 
MOP 500,00039 or EUR 55,000. 
Italy’s legislation on casinos and gambling is rather controversial. Although gambling is 
forbidden by Art. 718 Codice Penale, there are four casinos operating on the Italian territory, 
namely Casinò di San Remo, Casinò di Venezia, Casinò de la Vallee and Casinò Municipale 
di Campione d’Italia. Moreover, slot machine rooms were introduced with decreto legge 28 
aprile 2009, n. 39 and there are a significant number of authorized online casinos and sports 
betting centres. According to decreto legislativo 21 novembre 2007, n. 231, and in accordance 
with FATF Recommendation 10, these activities are required to perform CDD when 
                                                     
36 Charles Riley, “Macau’s gambling industry dwarfs Vegas,” CNN, January 6, 2014, accessed July 4, 2016, 
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customers carry out transactions above the applicable designated threshold of EUR 15,000, 
independently of whether they are carried out through one or more operations. In this sense, 
the Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli (AAMS) has established that multiple transactions 
are considered as smurfing if they occur within a period of seven days40. Casino-based 
tourism is increasing in popularity also in Italy, as people – mostly elders – travel from 
northern and central regions to the Casinò Perla, the largest casino in Europe, located in Nova 
Gorica, Slovenia. The Hit Group, owner of the Casinò Perla and other eight casinos, has 
agreement in place with Italian travel agencies located in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lombardia, 
Veneto and Emilia-Romagna in order to keep prices affordable41.  
 
The prevention of money laundering through casinos is a complex task, which requires 
regulations both from international sources and from national sources and casinos’ specific 
internal controls. FATF Recommendation 10 on CDD, which prohibits financial institutions 
from keeping anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names, shall be applied also to 
casinos, independently of whether they are physical or online, which are among the so-called 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPS). As stated in the interpretive 
note to Recommendations 22 and 23, the designated threshold on financial transactions that 
triggers CDD controls is USD/EUR 3,000. Furthermore, casinos and other DNFBPS shall be 
subject to national AML/CFT regulations. International cooperation remains a challenge for 
casino regulatory authorities on AML, as physical casinos, online casinos and casino-based 
tourism pose high risks in connection with money laundering. Gaming promoters play a 
fundamental role as facilitators of movement of capital and create layers of obscurity around 
the source and ownership of funds, which aid money launderers in carrying out their 
activities. Furthermore, although many countries are members of the FATF or other FATF-
Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), the harmonisation of the mechanisms for the prevention of 
money laundering through casinos is far from being reality. 
 
1.2.2 Real-estate sector 
 
The real-estate sector was the subject of a study carried out by the FATF in 200742. According 
to the report, this sector merits particular consideration given the large scope of monetary 
                                                     
40 Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli, “Servizio telematico per la comunicazione dei dati in materia di 
antiriciclaggio,” December 21, 2012. 
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transactions and its importance from both an economic perspective and a social perspective.  
Criminal organisations launder money through the real-estate sector in a number of ways, 
including:  
 loan-back schemes;  
 manipulation of the valuation of properties; 
 the concealment of money generated by illegal activities. 
 
Loan-back schemes 
 
Loan-back schemes may be used in the integration phase of money laundering to make the 
illicit funds look as though they originated from a legitimate source. Essentially, money 
launderers lend themselves money, so as to use the borrowing as a concealment for the ill-
gotten money. For instance, illicit funds can be placed in an offshore account set up through a 
shell company and then borrowed to the money launderer, net of a commission paid to any 
middle-person43. At the end of the operation, the money is clean because it looks as though it 
comes from a legitimate source. Moreover, the interest portion that the money launderer pays, 
at least on paper, is tax deductible. The FATF’s report also mentions back-to-back loan 
schemes, which are a variation of loan-back schemes in which a financial institution lends 
money to a borrower on the basis of the existence of collaterals that originate from criminal 
activities.  
 
Manipulation of the valuation of properties 
 
The manipulation of prices of real-estate property is particularly damaging to the economic 
system, given the importance of the sector. In some cases, the real value of a property may be 
difficult to estimate, especially in the case of atypical properties. In this case, money 
launderers may buy or sell a property at a price that is higher or lower than its market value. 
Properties may also be purchased through shell companies that are eventually wound up, a 
process that enables money launderers to insert a sum of money into the financial system by 
purchasing the property from the shell company at a price higher than the original purchase 
price. 
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Concealment of illicit funds 
 
The FATF Report on the real-estate sector mentions also the risks connected to money 
laundering through front businesses. The report identifies the same advantages that were 
illustrated in the previous chapter of this dissertation, namely the introduction of illegal funds 
into the system and the possibility to make additional profits. Properties that are more 
exposed to this risk are indeed those in which there is an extensive use of cash, such as hotels, 
restaurants and other similar activities. 
 
1.2.3 Legal professionals and accountants 
 
Professionals, including legal professionals and accountants, are subject to several FATF 
Recommendations. In particular, legal professionals have been included in the FATF 
Recommendations since 2003. According to the report published by the FATF in June 201344, 
money launderers seek out the expertise of legal professionals to complete certain transactions 
and access specialised legal and notarial skills and services. Professionals are required both to 
apply the CDD measures set forth in Recommendation 10 and to report suspicious 
transactions in accordance to Recommendation 20, although these requirement applies only 
when they undertake specific transactions for their clients in the course of business, including 
buying and selling of real estate, managing of client money or other assets, organisation of 
contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies and creation, operation 
or management of legal persons or arrangements. Legal professional activities present at least 
three unique features that must be considered when analysing the vulnerabilities of the sector. 
These unique features, according to the FATF, are ethical obligations, client funds, and 
confidentiality, privilege and professional secrecy. 
 
Ethical obligations 
 
In November 2012, the International Bar Association (IBA) presented the International 
Principles on Conduct for the Legal Profession. The IBA’s five principles on conduct for the 
legal profession are the following: 
 Independence, which shall be maintained in giving clients unbiased advice and 
representation; 
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 Honesty, integrity and fairness, that shall be maintained at the highest standards at all 
times; 
 Conflicts of interest, which shall be avoided; 
 Confidentiality, that shall be maintained and be afforded protection at all times 
regarding the affairs of present of former clients. A legal professional cannot invoke 
confidentiality in circumstances where the legal professional acts as an accomplice to 
a crime; 
 Clients’ interests, which shall be treated as paramount. 
 
In any case, despite these ethical obligations, the duties to the court and to the public take 
precedence over the duties to the client, so as to prevent legal professionals from being 
knowingly involved in money laundering or terrorist financing activities. 
 
Client funds 
 
Legal professionals are usually allowed to hold client funds. This unique feature of legal 
professionals has been identified as a potential vulnerability with respect to the money 
laundering risk, as criminals may move illicit funds through legal professionals as part of their 
placement and layering activities, exploiting the perceived respectability of the latter. 
 
Confidentiality, privilege and professional secrecy 
 
Although these three terms may seem interchangeable to describe the protection provided for 
the right of a client to obtain legal representation and advice and not to fear later disclosure of 
the discussions to his prejudice, they legally have different application and meaning. While it 
appears that confidentiality can be waived by the client or overridden by laws, legal 
professional privilege and professional secrecy are often tied to fundamental rights laid down 
in international obligations. Countries shall therefore develop legal frameworks that include 
the legislation of the remit of these three principles.   
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Chapter Two 
Criminal companies: rationale and characteristics 
 
 
 
Organised crime is a pervasive phenomenon that affects every economic system. So far, 
money laundering has been defined as the process used to clean dirty money and one of the 
methods illustrated in this chapter is the use of front businesses and shell companies. These 
businesses may also serve as headquarters for illicit activities carried out by criminal 
organisations. However, there are several other reasons that push criminal organisations to 
invest in the legal economy. In order to better understand the evolution and consequences of 
the involvement of criminal organisations in the economy, it is worth illustrating Italy’s 
peculiar relationship with organised crime and, in particular, with the mafia45. 
 
Although the mafia is generally perceived as a formal criminal organisation, this is just one 
side of the coin. Mafia, or being a mafioso, refers more to a behaviour that includes gaining 
respect and being honourable men46 rather than to the affinity to an association. Throughout 
the 1950’s, criminal organisations became conscious of the importance of the accumulation of 
wealth as a measure of success and power over other associations and individuals47, rather 
than the pure use of coercion aimed at intimidating others. According to a research carried out 
by the Department of Sociology of the University of Calabria, the number of honour killings 
that took place in Calabria more than halved between the 1950’s and the 1960’s. This change 
in the methodology and goals of criminal organisations, though, came at a price, and criminal 
organisations started to lose power. Arlacchi identifies two main reasons for the crisis 
experienced by criminal organisations in this period: the increase in popularity of left-wing 
parties in the Mezzogiorno and the stance of the State on the fight of criminal organisations, 
which culminates with the establishment of the Commissione parlamentare antimafia in 
196348. The marginalisation of the mafia between the end of the 1950’s and the end of the 
1960’s is probably one of the causes of the explosion of violence that took place in the 
1970’s. According to the Summary of Historical Statistics of ISTAT, the rate of people 
                                                     
45 For the purpose of this dissertation, unless stated otherwise, the terms “mafia” and “the mafia” refer to all the 
criminal organizations operating in the Italian territory and not to a specific clan or syndicate.  
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convicted for homicide was 0.4 per 100,000 inhabitants both in 1968 and in 1969, whereas it 
grew to 1.2 and 1.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1971 and 1972 respectively, to eventually 
stabilise at 0.9 at the end of the 1970’s49. Notwithstanding the stance of the State on the fight 
of criminal organisations, it is worth keeping in mind that associates of the mafia are 
unscrupulous and proud men who want to accumulate power and wealth. It is in this very 
historical context that criminal organisations started to invest intensely in the legal 
economy50. Criminal companies indeed respond to a wide range of necessities. On the one 
hand, criminal organisations may invest in the legal economy with the aim of exploiting their 
power and financial resources to increase their competitive advantage and, as a consequence, 
their profitability. On the other hand, criminal companies represent a fundamental instrument 
for increasing social consensus and controlling territories51. In order to achieve their goals, 
criminal organisations can intervene on their strategic plan with respect to the territory and the 
industry in which they operate and the structure of their companies. 
 
2.1 Profitability of criminal companies 
 
Criminal organisations, just like traditional entrepreneurs, may want to invest in the legal 
economy to obtain profits. Minimisation of costs and maximisation of profits and return on 
investments are all concepts that are common to both non-criminal and criminal companies. 
However, criminal organisations may exploit unconventional measures to increase their 
competitive advantage. According to Arlacchi52, such measures are the discouragement of 
competitors, the reduction of labour costs and the huge availability of funds. 
 
Discouragement of competitors 
 
Criminal organisations, by definition, are not prone to following rules and laws. As a 
consequence, the use of coercion in the business environment is not surprising. Criminal 
companies use threats and aggressiveness over employees, suppliers and customers as sources 
of competitive advantage, with the aim of reducing purchasing and labour costs and 
increasing revenues. Furthermore, criminal companies may also make use of other illicit 
behaviours in order to discourage competitors and increase their competitive advantage, such 
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as the use of poor quality raw materials, the sale of counterfeit products, fraudulent financial 
reporting, tax evasion and corruption of public officials. In particular, the latter may be aimed 
at artificially winning public tenders that would allow the criminal company to gain market 
share. This is probably one of the reasons for the high involvement of criminal organisations 
in industries characterised by a large availability of public funds. 
 
Reduction of labour costs 
 
Criminal companies may further increase their competitive advantage by reducing labour 
costs. In order to do so, employees may be employed illegally without social security benefits, 
or exposed to threats that are aimed at reducing their rights, such as the right to strike or to be 
paid for working overtime. As a result, criminal companies may be expected to report in their 
financial statements labour costs that are lower – as a percentage of sales revenue – than those 
reported by traditional companies operating in the same territory and industry. 
 
Availability of funds 
 
Criminal companies’ main feature is probably their higher availability of funds with respect to 
traditional companies. These funds are indeed not exclusively related to the reinvestment of 
earnings (i.e. retained earnings), but are mainly originated from the illicit activities 
perpetrated by the criminal organisation. These funds are usually not reported directly as 
shareholders’ equity, because they would be easily traced back to the mafia associates or 
nominees who injected them. Criminal organisations may therefore constitute complex groups 
of operating companies and shell companies and record the contribution of the ill-gotten 
funds as debts owed to associate companies. Alternatively, they may also make use of fraud 
schemes with the help of complicit suppliers and record the illicit funds as generic trade 
payables. As a consequence, criminal companies’ financial debts and shareholders’ equity 
may be expected to be lower than those reported by comparable companies. 
According to a report issued by Transcrime in 2013, criminal companies’ profitability is often 
significantly lower than the profitability of their legitimate competitors53, despite their unique 
sources of competitive advantage. This may lead to the conclusion that criminal organisations 
give the priority to other objectives, such as obtaining the control of a territory and creating 
social consensus, rather than increasing the profitability of their companies. Criminal 
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companies, therefore, may be seen as a tool for the creation of social consensus by, for 
instance, creating jobs for low-skilled workers. 
 
2.2 Investment trends of Italian criminal organisations 
 
The choice of investing in an industry rather than in another depends on the objectives that the 
criminal organisation wants to achieve. However, the economic literature suggests that 
criminal organisations tend to prefer certain industries. In order to better understand the 
rationale for the investment of criminal organisations in the legal economy, it is necessary to 
understand what are the main drivers for their investments and what are the features that make 
an industry more attractive. 
 
If we assume that criminal organisations mainly invest in the legal economy with the aim of 
realising economic profits by exploiting the unconventional measures illustrated in the last 
section, then we would conclude that there should be a significant positive relationship 
between the profitability of an industry and the investment rate of criminal organisations in 
that industry. However, according to the studies conducted by Transcrime, such relationship 
is null54. These results are probably not enough to rule out the possibility that criminal 
organisations invest in the legal economy to make profits, but they seem to confirm that this is 
not their main goal. On the other hand, if we assume that criminal organisations invest in the 
legal economy to launder money, create social consensus and control territories, it is worth 
identifying what are the industries that are suitable for the achievement of these objectives. 
This type of analyses usually make use of data related to the rate of confiscation of firms as a 
proxy for the investments of criminal organisations in a given country. However, it must be 
taken into account that results may be biased, given that confiscation may be easier in certain 
business sectors or territories. 
 
Construction 
 
Construction is historically one of the most representative industry of the investments of 
criminal organisations in the legal economy. Between 1983 and 2012, 22 per cent of all the 
companies confiscated were operating in the construction sector55. This percentage is 
increased to 30 per cent if we account also for the other activities of the production chain, 
                                                     
54 Ibid, 156. 
55 Ernesto U. Savona and Michele Riccardi (Eds.), “From Illegal Markets to Legitimate Businesses: The 
Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe,” (Trento: OCP, 2015), 189. 
31 
 
such as the start-up of the construction site and the manufacturing of concrete material. 
According to the Bribe Payers Index Report 2011, “Public work contracts and construction” is 
the sector with the worst score with respect to bribery56, which implies a higher risk 
connected to corruption related money laundering. The audit trail of bribes can be easily 
blurred thanks to the intensive use of cash, subcontractors and fraudulent invoices. The 
construction industry is also particularly important because of tenders. Criminal organisations 
can bribe politicians and local authority to obtain an unjust and illegal advantage over their 
competitors. Indeed, art. 416 bis of the Italian Penal Code identifies the use of coercion to 
obtain approval of tenders and concessions as a fundamental feature of criminal organisations. 
According to articles 83 and 84 of the Antimafia Code, public administrations shall obtain the 
necessary antimafia documentation before the approval of a concession or tender. Antimafia 
documentation consists of both the antimafia communication and the antimafia information: 
the former includes a declaration regarding the existence of circumstances that would cause 
loss of, suspension or ban from the public tender. The latter includes the information reported 
in the antimafia communication plus a declaration regarding the possibility of an infiltration 
by criminal organisations. According to art. 91, antimafia communication is required for 
public works whose value is between EUR 150,000 and the threshold set by the European 
Union, while antimafia information is required for public works whose value is above the 
community threshold. No communication is required for public works whose value is below 
EUR 150,000.  
As regards the creation of social consensus, the construction industry allows criminal 
organisations to create jobs, which may consist of illegal contracts that can be used to reduce 
labour costs and increase profitability. Furthermore, the construction industry is particularly 
relevant in local economies, where it permits to maintain a high level of control over the 
development of the territory. 
 
Food products and restaurants 
 
The food industry is a major sector in terms of criminal organisations’ investments. Between 
1983 and 2012, 12 per cent of all the companies confiscated were operating in this industry, 
which includes bars, restaurants, retail and wholesale57. As already described in the previous 
chapter, restaurants and bars are commonly used as front businesses because of their high 
                                                     
56 Transparency International, “Bribe Payers Index 2011,” (Berlin: Transcrime International, 2011), 15. 
57 Ernesto U. Savona and Michele Riccardi (Eds.), “From Illegal Markets to Legitimate Businesses: The 
Portfolio of Organised Crime in Europe,” (Trento: OCP, 2015), 189. 
32 
 
cash intensity that allows money launderers to blend ill-gotten funds and legitimate cash 
flows. Retail and wholesale of food products are two sectors that are particularly susceptible 
to criminal organisations’ infiltration in Italy. Given their relevance both from an economic 
perspective and from a health perspective, it is clear that law enforcement agencies, such as 
Nuclei Antisofisticazione e Sanità (NAS) dei Carabinieri, are required to make a great effort 
to tackle criminal companies operating in these sectors. According to a report issued by 
FareAmbiente in 2015, 37,529 inspections were carried out by the NAS in 2014, which 
identified 12,407 firms not compliant and confiscated goods for over EUR 450 million58. 
Although the data suggest that criminal organisations mainly invest in the production chain of 
meat, pasta and fish and in restaurants and bars, the investment portfolio depends on the 
specificities of the single criminal organisations. For example, while Cosa Nostra 
concentrates its investments especially in the construction industry59, the Camorra is much 
more oriented toward the wholesale of food60. Even within the same clan, the distribution of 
investments may vary. While the Casalesi and Cesarano are both associated to the Camorra, 
the former are much more committed to the construction industry, while the latter is investing 
especially in the wholesale of food and other products61. 
 
2.3 Management and disposal of confiscated companies and assets 
 
The majority of data regarding criminal companies comes indeed from information regarding 
the confiscation of criminal companies themselves. Given the relevance of criminal 
organisations’ investments in the legal economy, it is worth describing the main laws in force 
in Italy as regards the management of confiscated companies and assets. The starting point of 
this subchapter is Legge 7 marzo 1996, n. 109 “Disposizioni in materia di gestione e 
destinazione di beni sequestrate o confiscati”. The aim of this law is to establish the best 
practices in terms of destination and reuse of confiscated assets, on the basis of their 
characteristics: movable properties shall be sold, while immovable properties shall be either 
held by the State or transferred to municipalities. Each allocation procedure was supposed to 
last no longer than 120 days, but in practice they often lasted more62, with possible negative 
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economic consequences caused by the deterioration of the assets. In order to guarantee a 
faster and more efficient management and allocation of confiscated goods, Legge 31 marzo 
2010, n. 50 established the Agenzia Nazionale dei Beni Sequestrati e Confiscati alla 
criminalità organizzata (ANBSC).  
The necessity of organising all the laws and provisions on the fight against criminal 
organisations led to the issuance of the Antimafia Code in 2011.  The code is aimed at dealing 
with the management and allocation of both confiscated criminal companies and assets, with a 
particular focus on the former because of their relevant social and economic implications. 
According to art. 35 of the code, the designated judicial administrator shall manage the 
confiscated goods with the aim, if possible, of increasing their profitability.  
 
One of the main risks connected to the management of confiscated companies, which is likely 
to hinder the profitability of the firm, are the so-called “costs of legality”63, that are those 
costs related to the organisational restructuring and employment contracts transition from the 
illegal status to a legal condition. The profitability of criminal companies often depends on 
the use of the unconventional practices described at the beginning of this chapter. It follows 
that the judicial administration in charge of the restructuring of a confiscated company is 
often forced to reduce the workforce as a consequence of the new contractual positions of the 
employees, who in turn may be discouraged and unmotivated. Furthermore, the reduction of 
workforce and the acknowledgment of the new contractual positions may also lead to strikes 
and requests for a renewal of union agreements.  
Employees, though, are not the only stakeholders who may compromise the judicial 
administration. Suppliers and customers may stop doing business with the confiscated 
company and bank may interrupt their lines of credit, even though a study conducted by 
Banca d’Italia in 2013 shows that there is not a significant reduction of banks’ lines of credit 
granted to confiscated companies in the three years following the confiscation64. 
 
According to art. 48 of the Antimafia Code, the assets shall be held by the State and either: 
 rent out, if there are well-founded prospects of continuation or recovery of the 
economic activity. The assets shall be rent out either to public or private companies 
upon payment or to cooperatives of workers employed by the confiscated company 
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free of charge. The selection of the tenant shall be taken with the aim of maintaining 
the current level of workforce; 
 sold, at a price not below the ANBSC’s valuation, if the sale maximises public interest 
or guarantees the compensation to victims of crimes carried out by criminal 
organisations; 
 liquidated, for the same reasons as in the previous case.  
 
The decision taken by the judicial administration shall be aimed, if possible, at increasing the 
profitability of the confiscated assets. Although the possibility to rent out the assets to the 
workers employed by the confiscated company represents a good solution from a societal 
point of view, it is often impracticable, given the educational and financial constraints faced 
by the employees. As a matter of fact, 65-70 per cent of all the companies confiscated from 
criminal organisations are generally liquidated, while 15-20 per cent fail and only 15-20 per 
cent remain active65. 
 
2.4 Financial statement red flags 
 
Investigations into criminal organisations and criminal companies are complex operations that 
require different skills, including competences in accounting and financial statements 
analysis. Criminal companies, depending on whether they are aimed at maximising 
profitability or supporting other companies, may present a number of features in their 
financial statements that investigators shall consider throughout their investigations.  
In this section, these red flags are illustrated, according to the report issued by Transcrime in 
2013 and the assumptions formulated throughout this chapter, with the aim of providing a 
practical framework that can also be applied to the analyses of case studies. 
 
Red flags related to financing sources 
 
One of the main features of criminal companies is the availability of huge financial resources, 
that is the availability of ill-gotten funds that can be used to finance the legitimate activities of 
the company. As a consequence, it is possible to assume that a criminal company may present 
on its balance sheet a level of financial indebtedness on average lower than that of a 
legitimate competitor. However, criminal organisations may exercise their influence on the 
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local political and financial systems to obtain economic advantages, such as favourable loans 
and access to subsidies on a municipality or community level. It follows that the level of 
indebtedness of a criminal company may also be on average higher than that of a legitimate 
competitor. 
 
Together with financial indebtedness, investigators shall pay attention also to commercial 
debts. Criminal companies, as already mentioned, may use coercion and threats over suppliers 
to increase their competitive advantage. This abuse of power may lead to longer terms of 
payment, which are reflected on the balance sheet as a higher amount of accounts payable in 
comparison with legitimate competitors. Moreover, criminal organisations may also conceal 
the use of ill-gotten funds as commercial debts owed to complicit suppliers or bogus 
companies, further increasing the amount of accounts payable. 
 
Criminal organisations, in order to use their ill-gotten funds as a financial source for their 
criminal companies, need to blur the audit trails of their contributions. Besides the use of 
commercial debts, illicit funds may be contributed as generic “other debts” or debts owed to 
third parties or affiliated companies. Consequently, these financial statement line items may 
be higher on average than those reported by similar legal companies. On the contrary, 
shareholders’ equity may be below the average level for similar companies, as it would 
directly connect the associates of the criminal organisations or nominees to the company. 
 
Red flags related to equity investments 
 
Regardless of the purposes served by criminal companies, criminal organisations need 
secrecy. The necessity of concealing their illicit activities and blurring the audit trail of their 
operations may lead to a significantly high use of equity investments, also with respect to 
comparable non-criminal companies. These equity investments may also be held in foreign 
companies located in tax havens, where the requirements for the start-up of new companies 
are usually looser. 
In order to understand whether criminal companies indeed use equity investments to conceal 
their illegal activities, the fourth chapter of this dissertation consists of an empirical analysis 
of a sample of criminal companies based in the Piemonte region. The analysis is aimed at 
explaining whether criminal companies hold more equity investments than non-criminal 
companies, either in Italy or abroad. 
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Red flags related to current and non-current assets 
 
Criminal companies’ asset structures depend on the purpose they serve. While criminal 
companies that produce goods and services may have similar asset structures in comparison 
with legitimate competitors, they are not the only type of criminal companies that criminal 
organisations use. Front businesses, as already described in the first chapter of this 
dissertation, are one of the most common methods for money laundering. Although they 
appear as though they are traditional businesses, their main purpose is to clean the illicit funds 
generated from illegal activities, which can be achieved thanks to the prominent use of cash. 
In this sense, it is plausible to assume that their asset structure may consist mainly of cash and 
cash equivalents and other current assets, including accounts receivable and other short-term 
credits. It follows that non-current assets may be present in a front business’ balance sheet, 
but limited to the essential amount needed to operate. 
 
Criminal organisations also use the so-called “paper-mill companies”66, which are those 
companies that are used to produce bogus invoices to launder money. They respond to the 
necessity of concealing money transfers from criminal companies to the associates of the 
criminal organisation. They may also serve as legal entities to which assign the property of 
real-estate, vehicles and other non-current assets. In this case, it is reasonable to expect a high 
level of both current assets, such as accounts receivable, and non-current assets. 
 
Red flags related to the income statement 
 
The value of production, cost structure and profitability of criminal companies clearly depend 
on the purpose such companies serve. It is worth noting, though, that financial statement data 
of criminal companies may be the result of fraudulent financial reporting. Income statement 
line items may be conveniently adjusted to conceal any possible red flag. For instance, over-
invoicing practices may be used to reduce taxable income and conceal money transfers. On 
the one hand, operating criminal companies’ profitability may be the result of the 
unconventional measures described at the beginning of this chapter. Threats and coercion may 
be used either against suppliers to reduce costs of materials and services or against 
competitors to manipulate tenders. Salaries may also be reduced by paying workers off the 
books. Low quality, sub-standard and low-price raw materials – which are particularly 
dangerous in certain sectors – may also be over-invoiced so as to facilitate trade-based money 
                                                     
66 Translated from the Italian “cartiere”. The literal translation seems to fit, as they are companies whose main 
purpose is to produce “paper”, such as bogus invoices for goods and services that were not actually supplied. 
37 
 
laundering. On the other hand, paper-mill companies’ value of production may be expected to 
be low and subject to significant variability from one period to another. Furthermore, since 
their main purpose is to generate bogus transactions, revenues and costs may even present the 
same trends. For these reasons, paper-mills may be easier to be identified through statistical 
analyses. 
 
These red flags represent an attempt to create a practical framework for the identification of 
criminal companies through both accounting analyses and statistical analyses. In this sense, 
the research illustrated in the last chapter of this dissertation applies the theoretical concepts 
related to the use of equity investments by criminal companies with the aim of understanding 
whether it is possible to draw any interesting conclusion.  
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Chapter Three 
Combating money laundering and terrorist financing 
 
 
 
Over the last few decades, but in particular after the recent waves of international terrorism 
and fight to drug trafficking, there have been an increase in AML/CFT regulations and 
controls. The success of criminal organisations and terrorist financing largely depends on the 
quality of a country’s AML/CFT regime, that includes enforcement provisions, penalties and 
confiscations and a thorough recognition of predicate crimes. The lack of an effective 
AML/CFT legislation not only facilitates crime and corruption, but is also likely to reduce 
foreign private investments and weaken the financial sector. 
 
Although there are examples of AML legislations that can be traced back to the 1970’s, such 
as the U.S. BSA, it is only in the 1980’s that cooperation between states became a priority.  
In 1988, with the Vienna Convention, the United Nations (UN) set the ground for the fight 
against drug trafficking, establishing a list of criminal offences and rules for the confiscation 
of drugs and proceeds derived from drug trafficking. Even though money laundering is not 
specifically mentioned in the Convention, the signatory states were required to initiate, 
develop or improve specific training programs aimed at dealing with the methods used for 
transfer, concealment or disguise of proceeds derived from drug trafficking. 
 
In 1989, during the G-7 Summit that was held in Paris, the FATF was established. In April 
1990, the FATF issued a set of forty recommendations aimed at providing a comprehensive 
plan of action against money laundering. In October 2001, one month after the September 11 
attacks, the FATF issued eight more recommendations aimed at dealing with the issue of 
terrorist financing, which became nine in 2004. Finally, the FATF reviewed its standards and 
published a revised version of the Forty Recommendations and Nine Special 
Recommendations. The FATF also issues annual reports on money laundering trends, which 
were at the basis of the first chapter of this dissertation. 
 
In 2000, the UN signed the Palermo Convention, which entered into force in 2003. The aim of 
the Convention was to take a major step forward in the fight against transnational organized 
crime, including not only drug trafficking, but also trafficking in persons, especially women 
and children, smuggling of migrants, and illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms. The 
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United Nations recognised the importance of cooperation among members also in the fight 
against criminal organisations and money laundering, which was specifically dealt with in the 
art. 7 of the Convention “Measures to combat money-laundering”. 
Besides international cooperation, states are required to issue domestic laws and regulations 
against money laundering. In Italy, the primary national regulation currently effective 
(hereinafter referred to as “Italian AML Law”) entered into force in 2007 and represents the 
implementation of the European Union Directive 2005/60/EC. In order to provide a 
comparative framework, it is worth describing the major differences – if any – between the 
Italian AML Law and a foreign legislation. In this sense, the aim of this chapter, after an 
introduction to the aforementioned international initiatives, is to compare the Italian AML 
Law with the recent Chinese AML Law, which entered into force in 2007. 
 
3.1 International standards and conventions 
 
The necessity of dealing with cross-border phenomena like money laundering and terrorist 
financing led states to the development of a set of standards and conventions that are 
essentially aimed at increasing international cooperation. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
it is worth illustrating the main international conventions and standards dealing with money 
laundering and terrorist financing, namely the FATF Recommendations, the Terrorist 
Financing Convention and the Palermo Convention. 
 
3.1.1 FATF Recommendations 
 
The FATF Recommendations can be seen as a set of measures which countries are 
encouraged to follow in order to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. 
Recommendation 1 suggests to adopt a risk-based approach (RBA) to money laundering and 
terrorist financing. This approach means that “countries, competent authorities and financial 
institutions are expected to identify, assess and understand the ML/TF risks to which they are 
exposed and take AML/CFT measures commensurate to those risks”67. The general principle 
of a RBA is to require financial institutions and DNFBPs to take enhanced measures to 
manage risks in those sectors where higher risks are expected. Simplified measures should be 
allowed only where lower risks are identified. According to Recommendation 2, AML/CFT 
measures should be the result of activities that allow “policy-makers, the financial 
intelligence unit (FIU), law enforcement authorities, supervisors and other relevant 
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competent authorities, at the policy-making and operational levels, [to] have effective 
mechanisms which enable them to cooperate, and, where appropriate, coordinate 
domestically with each other”. 
 
The FATF Recommendations, as stated in Recommendation 3, adopt the definitions of money 
laundering and terrorist financing in accordance respectively with the Palermo Convention 
and the Terrorist Financing Convention. Furthermore, they also include a number of measures 
enforced by the two conventions. For instance, as regards confiscation and provisional 
measures, Recommendation 4 suggests that countries should confiscate “property laundered; 
proceeds from, or instrumentalities used in or intended for use in money laundering or 
predicate offences; property that is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for 
use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations; property of 
corresponding value”, which is significantly similar to the provisions laid out by art. 12 of the 
Palermo Convention. 
 
The preventive measures suggested by the FATF to guarantee the transparency of financial 
institutions include CDD and record-keeping. According to Recommendation 10, financial 
institutions should undertake CDD measures when: 
(i) establishing business relations; 
(ii) carrying out occasional transactions above the applicable designated threshold 
(USD/EUR 15,000) or wire transfers in particular circumstances; 
(iii) there is suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; 
(iv) the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously 
obtained customer identification data. 
 
The measures suggested by the FATF are aimed at increasing the transparency of transactions 
undertaken throughout the course of business relationships. Therefore, they include – but are 
not limited to – provisions related to customer and beneficial owner identification through 
independent documents and sources, also with respect to the intended nature of the business 
relationship. Financial institutions in particular should be required to apply CDD measures 
using a RBA and, where they are unable to comply with the requirements suggested by the 
FATF, should be required not to commence business relations or terminate the business 
relationship. Furthermore, Recommendation 11 suggests that financial institutions should also 
be required to “maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both 
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domestic and international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from 
the competent authorities”. 
The customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements are not only limited to financial 
institutions, but apply to other DNFBPs, as suggested by Recommendation 22. In particular, 
they apply to: 
 Casinos, for transactions equal or above the designated threshold; 
 Real estate agents; 
 Dealers in precious metals and/or precious stones, for transactions equal or above the 
designated threshold; 
 Lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals and accountants, with 
respect to a wide set of operations; 
 Trust and company service providers, with respect to a wide set of operations. 
 
In order to monitor the correct and effective implementation of the FATF Recommendations, 
“countries should establish a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that serves as a national centre 
for the receipt and analysis of STRs and other information relevant to money laundering, 
associated predicate offences and terrorist financing, and for the dissemination of the results 
of that analysis”. According to the interpretive note to Recommendation 29, FIU should add 
value to the information received and held through two types of analyses: operational analysis 
and strategic analysis. The aim of the former is “to identify specific targets, to follow the trail 
of particular activities or transactions, and to determine links between those targets and 
possible proceeds of crime, money laundering, predicate offences or terrorist financing”. The 
purpose of the latter is “to identify money laundering and terrorist financing related trends 
and patterns [...] and to determine money laundering and terrorist financing related threats 
and vulnerabilities”. The results of these analyses should be both spontaneously 
disseminated, when there are grounds to suspect money laundering of terrorist financing, and 
disseminated upon request from competent authorities. Financial intelligence units should be 
“operationally independent and autonomous”, which means that the FIU should have the 
authority to carry out its functions free from political, government or industry influence or 
interference. Italy’s FIU became operative in 2008, taking over from the Italian Foreign 
Exchange Office and is structured in compliance with international standards. It is an 
independent and autonomous body set up within the Bank of Italy whose main purpose is to 
collect information on potential cases of money laundering and terrorist financing starting 
from the STRs filed by financial institutions, analyse the data and decide whether it is 
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necessary to pass information to investigative authorities. The FIU also conducts studies with 
regards to trends and weaknesses of the system, including economic sectors at risk, categories 
of payment instruments and include the results of its studies in the annual report that is 
transmitted to the Ministry of Economy and Finance for forwarding to Parliament68. Among 
the powers granted to the FIU, is worth mentioning the possibility to freeze suspicious 
transactions for up to five working days. 
 
International cooperation is encouraged by the FATF in the last five Recommendations. In 
particular, Recommendation 36 suggests that countries should implement fully, among the 
others, the Vienna Convention, the Terrorist Financing Convention and the Palermo 
Convention (these last two are briefly illustrated in the following pages). According to 
Recommendation 37, countries should also provide “the widest possible range of mutual 
legal assistance in relation to money laundering, associated predicate offences and terrorist 
financing investigation, prosecutions, and related proceeding”. As regards terrorist financing, 
the FATF published nine recommendations to deal with the matter in 2004. These 
recommendations were aimed at combating, in combination with the Forty 
Recommendations, the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts. These Nine Special 
Recommendations were eventually combined with the Forty Recommendations so as to have 
a unique and complete operational framework on both money laundering and terrorist 
financing. In regard to terrorist financing, particular attention is paid to Non-profit 
organisations (NPOs). According to the FATF, NPOs can be defined as “a legal person or 
arrangement or organisation that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for 
purposes such as charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or 
for the carrying out of other types of good works”. Non-profit organisations play a 
fundamental role in several national economies and social systems, by providing essential 
services to those in need around the world. Potential abuses of NPOs carried out by terrorist 
groups not only facilitates terrorist activities, but also jeopardise the ability of NPOs to sustain 
the social system. Recommendation 8 (formerly known as Special Recommendation VIII) 
states that “countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations to entities that can 
be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly 
vulnerable, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused”. According to the 
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8, NPOs may be vulnerable to abuse by terrorist groups 
for several reasons, including their access to considerable sources of funds and their high 
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cash-intensity. Furthermore, NPOs can often be set up with few formalities and may be 
subject to little or no governmental oversight.  
Recommendation 8 continues by stating that “countries should ensure that [NPOs] cannot be 
misused: 
i. by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities; 
ii. to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for purposes 
of escaping assets freezing measures; 
iii. to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate 
purposes to terrorist organisations.” 
 
According to the FATF, Non-profit organisations are exposed to both organisational 
vulnerabilities and sectoral vulnerabilities69. The former are seen where legitimate NPOs are 
either exploited by external actors or deceived by internal actors, while the latter include cases 
where illegitimate organisations (known as “sham NPOs”) enters the sector. These 
vulnerabilities may be exploited by terrorist organisations in a number of ways, including: 
 the diversion of funds to a terrorist entity; 
 the affiliation with a terrorist group; and 
 the promotion of terrorism recruitment-related activities. 
 
Diversion of funds to terrorist groups may take place at some point through the NPO’s 
business process, which consists in raising funds for humanitarian programs. This type of 
vulnerability may be carried out by either internal or external actors. According to the FATF, 
the vast majority of cases of diversion of funds involved actors internal to the NPO70. The 
diversion of funds may happen before the deposits into the NPO’s accounts or during the 
retention and transfer phases, through several methods including wire transfers and cash 
couriers. It is worth noting how both these methods are explicitly dealt with in the Forty 
FATF Recommendations, respectively in Recommendation 16 and Recommendation 32. 
 
Another common method of abuse observed by the FATF is related to the existence of 
operational affiliations between an NPO and terrorist entities. Affiliations may involve NPOs’ 
internal actors, such as directing officials and staff, who have suspected links with a terrorist 
entity or more formalised relationships between the NPO as a whole and the terrorist group. 
                                                     
69 FATF, “Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-Profit Organizations,” (Paris: FATF, 2014), 19.  
70 Ibid, 38. 
44 
 
NPOs’ decentralised management and interconnectedness of networks are features that make 
NPOs both effective instruments and vulnerable to abuses at the same time. 
NPOs may also be exploited by terrorist groups for recruitment purposes. According to the 
FATF, there have been cases where NPOs were involved not only in the transfer of funds to 
terrorists, but also in the carrying out of fire bomb attacks and in the organisation of events 
that support terrorism71. In order to deal with these potential abuses, countries are encouraged 
to undertake domestic reviews of their NPO sector. The approach laid out by the FATF in the 
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 involves the following four elements:  
 outreach to the sector; 
 supervision or monitoring; 
 effective investigation and information gathering; 
 effective mechanisms for international cooperation. 
 
Outreach to the NPO sector should include policies to promote transparency and integrity, 
programs to raise awareness about the vulnerabilities of NPOs to terrorist abuse and 
cooperation on the development of best practices to address terrorist financing risks and 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Supervision or monitoring are related to the gathering and publication of information on the 
purpose and objectives of NPOs, on the identities of the persons who control or direct their 
activities and those of their beneficiaries. Furthermore, NPOs should also issue annual 
financial statements and put in place effective controls to ensure that all funds are fully 
accounted for, and are spent appropriately. 
 
Effective investigation and information gathering, also on an international scale, include 
cooperation and coordination among different countries and levels of authorities so as to set-
up appropriate mechanisms to ensure that, when there is reasonable ground to suspect that a 
particular NPO is being exploited by terrorist groups, this information is promptly shared with 
those in charge of domestic or international investigative actions. 
 
Notwithstanding the effort put by the FATF into fighting money laundering and terrorist 
financing, there have been several criticisms on whether this effort is doing any good. In 
particular, a report published by the Center on Law & Globalization in 2014 has raised several 
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questions on the effectiveness of the fight against global money laundering and terrorist 
financing. According to the authors of the report, although the scope of AML laws has 
widened and international cooperation and information-sharing have undoubtedly improved 
throughout the last decade, there are still a number of issues to be solved. First, the FATF 
objectives are not yet specified in a way that allows to undertake outcome assessments and 
there are major deficits in the quality of data that are gathered. Second, and perhaps more 
important, there are not assessments on whether the FATF system produces public or private 
“bads” along with public and private goods72. The fight against money laundering and 
terrorist financing is undoubtedly a fundamental task for any government, therefore it is 
necessary to understand whether a wider scope of AML/CFT laws has any negative impact on 
the stability of both the economic system and the financial system. 
 
3.1.2 Terrorist Financing Convention 
 
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was signed in 
New York in 1999 and represents a formal action taken by the UN to counter terrorist 
organisations by requiring State Parties to adopt measures aimed at identifying and 
suppressing the sources of financing of terrorism.  
 
Article 2 of the Convention defines terrorism as “an act which constitutes an offence within 
the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex [to the Convention]” or 
“any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act”. In 
particular, the Convention is concerned with the direct or indirect collection of funds aimed at 
carrying out an act within the scope of the previous definitions.   
 
Art. 4 of the Convention includes the measures that State Parties are required to adopt, which 
include establishing as criminal offences the offences listed in art. 2 and “to make those 
offences punishable by appropriate penalties”. Further measures are required by art. 8 for the 
“identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the 
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purpose of committing the offences set forth in art. 2 as well as the proceeds derived from 
such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture”. In this sense, art. 18 provides a list of 
measures that are deemed necessary to prevent and counter preparations for the commission 
of the offences set forth in art. 2. These measures include the prohibition of “illegal activities 
of persons and organisations that knowingly encourage, instigate, organise or engage in the 
commission of offences set forth in art. 2” and requirements for financial institutions and 
other professions involved in financial transactions, which are required “to pay special 
attention to unusual or suspicious transactions and report transactions suspected of stemming 
from a criminal activity”. 
 
Cooperation among countries is of paramount importance to the suppression of terrorist 
financing. According to art. 12 of the Convention “State Parties shall afford one another the 
greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations or criminal or 
extradition proceedings in respect of the offences set forth in article 2, including assistance in 
obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the proceedings”. It is worth noting that 
a request for mutual legal assistance cannot be refused neither on the ground of bank secrecy 
nor on the sole ground that it concerns a fiscal offence. 
 
As of January 2011, the treaty has been ratified by 173 countries73, thus making it one of the 
most successful anti-terrorism treaties in history in terms of ratifications. In terms of 
effectiveness, it is difficult to measure the results that the Convention may have generated for 
at least two reasons. First, as the name may suggest, the Terrorist Financing Convention is 
only one aspect of a broader international framework to prevent and suppress the support of 
terrorism. Although terrorist financing is one of the most critical aspects of the fight against 
terrorist organisations, there are other activities, such as recruitment and supply of weapons, 
that need to be considered. Indeed, the “Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism 
Conventions and Protocols” issued by the UNODC includes other eleven universal 
instruments74, such as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
(1970), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980) and the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997). 
 
                                                     
73 Centre for International Law of the National University of Singapore, “1999 International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,” accessed August 23, 2016, https://cil.nus.edu.sg/1999/1999-
international-convention-for-the-suppression-of-the-financing-of-terrorism/.  
74 UNODC, “Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols,” (New York: 
UNODC, 2013), 3. 
47 
 
Second, the Terrorism Financing Convention entered into force in 2002, in the aftermath of 
the September 11 attacks. This event led the UN to the adoption of the Resolution 1373 on 28 
September 2001, which called upon all States, among other things, to “become parties as 
soon as possible to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, 
including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 
December 1999”. Furthermore, Resolution 1373 established a Committee of the Security 
Council, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). The aim of the CTC is to monitor the 
implementation of the measures included in the Resolution itself. These measures are similar 
to those included in the Terrorism Financing Convention, such as the prevention and 
suppression of the financing of terrorist acts, the freeze of funds of persons who commit or 
attempt to commit terrorist acts and the denial of all forms of financial support for terrorist 
groups. 
 
3.1.3 Palermo Convention 
 
The purpose of the Palermo Convention, as stated in art. 1, is “to promote cooperation to 
prevent and combat transnational organised crime”. Organised crime is, therefore, a crime 
committed by an organised group. According to the definitions provided by art. 2, it is 
possible to describe organised crime as the perpetration of a serious crime – which is an 
offence “punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more 
serious penalty” – by an organised criminal group, that is defined as “a structured group of 
three or more persons [...] acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences established in accordance with [the] Convention”.  
 
Contrary to the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention explicitly deal with money 
laundering. In particular, art. 6 requires State Parties to adopt measures to establish as 
criminal offences both “the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the 
property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence 
to evade the legal consequences of his or her action” and “the concealment or disguise of the 
true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to 
property, knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime”. Given that money laundering 
is by definition the consequence of other criminal activities, states are required to apply art. 6 
“to the widest range of predicate offences”. 
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According to art. 7, States “shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, where appropriate, 
other bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering, within its competence, in order to 
deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, which regime shall emphasise requirements 
for customer identification, record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions”. 
Furthermore, the Convention requires State Parties to “cooperate and exchange information 
at the international level” and to “implement feasible measures to detect and monitor the 
movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders”. With 
respect to these measures, it is worth noting the similarities to the requirements set by the 
FATF Recommendations, such as CDD and SARs. 
 
The Palermo Convention sets also a number of measures with respect to the confiscation and 
seizure of proceeds of crime. According to art. 12 of the Convention, State Parties shall adopt 
measures aimed at enabling the confiscation of both “proceeds of crime derived from offences 
covered by [the] Convention or property the value of which corresponds to that of such 
proceeds” and “property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in 
offences covered by [the] Convention”. Furthermore, art. 12 of the Convention recognises the 
possibility that “proceeds of crime [may be] transformed or converted, in part or in full, into 
other property or intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources”. Although 
the Convention requires State Parties to confiscate such properties up to the assessed value of 
the proceeds, this is often impracticable75. 
 
Art. 18 of the Palermo Convention deals specifically with international cooperation and, in 
particular, with mutual legal assistance. Art. 18 of the Convention states that “State Parties 
shall afford one another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, 
prosecutions and judicial proceedings in relation to the offences covered by [the] 
Convention”. Given that mutual legal assistance is linked to the sharing of information, art. 
18 of the Convention states also that “without prejudice to domestic law, the competent 
authorities of a State Party may, without prior request, transmit information relating to 
criminal matters to a competent authority in another State Party where they believe that such 
information could assist the authority in undertaking or successfully concluding inquiries and 
criminal proceedings or could result in a request formulated by the latter State Party 
pursuant to [the] Convention”.  
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A number of scholars have argued that the Palermo Convention, which was supposed to be 
the main instrument against transnational organised crime, has had an ambiguous impact over 
the past decade76. In particular, two main factors have contributed to the partial 
ineffectiveness of the Convention. First, transnational organised crime has evolved and 
adapted to the legislative framework provided by the Convention. Second, other international 
threats have emerged, such as terrorism, which have slowed the momentum that led to the 
signing of the Convention in 2000. The main issue, however, remains the limited possibility 
to measure what has been achieved. Monitoring the number of countries that adheres to the 
Convention is not enough, considering that it is not possible to obtain reliable data on whether 
these adhesions entail a reduction in transnational organised crime. 
 
3.2 National AML/CFT legislations: a comparison between the Italian and 
Chinese legislative frameworks 
 
The Italian anti-money laundering law (decreto legislativo 21 novembre 2007, n. 231) was 
promulgated in 2007 in order to transpose the EU Directive 2005/60/EC. In the same year, the 
Chinese anti-money laundering law (Law 3600/06.10.31) came into force.  The purpose of 
this section is to briefly analyse the major differences, if any, between the two legislative 
frameworks. Given the cultural, economic and historical differences between the two 
countries, and given the transnational nature of money laundering and terrorist financing, it is 
worth comparing the two laws to have a better idea on how different countries are dealing 
with these two phenomena. 
 
Definitions 
 
The Italian AML law defines money laundering as a criminal action that may consist of: 
a) “the conversion or transfer of goods, knowing that such goods originated from a 
criminal activity or participation thereto, with the aim of concealing the illicit source 
of such goods or helping whoever takes part in such activity to avoid the judicial 
consequences of his own actions”;  
b) “the concealment of the real nature, origin, position, arrangement, movement, 
ownership of goods or rights on such goods, carried out knowing that such goods 
originated from a criminal activity or participation thereto”; 
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c) “the purchase, possession or the use of goods knowing, at the moment of the 
reception, that such goods originated from a criminal activity or participation 
thereto”. 
 
The Chinese AML law, instead, defines money laundering activities as those activities 
“involving the use of various means to cover up or conceal the origin and nature of criminal 
proceeds and benefits derived from narcotics-related crime, gang-type organised crime, 
crime of terrorism, crime of smuggling, crimes of misappropriation of public property and 
bribery, crime of undermining financial management order, crime of financial fraud and 
other crimes”.  
 
The two definitions of money laundering given by the Italian and Chinese law are clearly 
similar, yet they present a number of differences. While they both refer to goods and proceeds 
originated from criminal activities, the operations encompassed are different. On the one 
hand, the Italian law refers to three main operations that may be carried out, namely the 
conversion or transfer of the goods, the concealment of their real nature or other information, 
and the purchase of the goods. These operations are deemed punishable if they are carried out 
being aware of the illicit source of the goods. On the other hand, the Chinese law refers only 
to the cover up or concealment of the ill-gotten goods and proceeds.  
 
With respect to terrorism and terrorist financing, the differences are even more noteworthy. 
While the Italian AML law refers to another Legislative Decree (decreto legislativo 22 giugno 
2007, n. 109), which defines terrorist financing as “any activity, with any mean, aimed at the 
collection, funding, intermediation, safekeeping, custody or distribution of funds or economic 
resources, whatever their sources, intended to be totally or partially used to carry out one or 
more than one terrorist-related crimes or used to facilitate the carrying out of one or more 
than one terrorist-related crimes, irrespective of the effective use of the funds or economic 
resources aforementioned”. The Chinese law mentions terrorist financing only in art. 36, 
which states that “[the] Law shall govern the monitoring of funds suspected of being destined 
for use in terrorist activities, unless otherwise specified in other laws, in which case such laws 
shall prevail”. In this sense, it is worth noting that until the end of 2015, when the PRC 
promulgated the Counter-Terrorism Law, the Chinese AML law – with all its limitations – 
was the country’s main instrument for combating terrorist financing. 
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Structure and scope 
 
The Italian AML law includes five articles devoted to the identification of the categories 
subject to the law, namely financial intermediaries and other institutions engaged in finance 
business, professionals, auditors, and other categories, including debt collection agencies, 
casinos and online casinos. Each of these categories are subject to different provisions, in 
accordance with art. 15, 16, 17 and 18. The Chinese law, instead, only refers to financial 
institutions, which are defined in art. 34 as to include “policy banks, commercial banks, credit 
cooperatives, postal savings institutions, trust and investment corporations, securities 
companies, futures brokerages and insurance companies established in accordance with the 
law and engaged in finance business, as well as other institutions engaged in finance 
business”. The scope of non-financial institutions and their obligations are not included in the 
AML law, but are formulated by the State Council. 
 
Anti-money laundering authorities 
 
In Italy, the Ministry of Economics and Finance is responsible for the anti-money laundering 
policies and activities. Italy’s FIU is set up within the Bank of Italy and, in accordance with 
art. 6 of the Italian AML law, it carries out several activities, including the analysis of 
financial flows with the aim of identifying and preventing money laundering and terrorist 
financing, the financial analysis of the STRs received from financial and non-financial 
institutions, and the acquisition of further data and information in order to perform analyses 
and prepare statistical models. Further controls may be performed from both external agents, 
such as the Bank of Italy, the Consob (Commissione nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) and 
the IVASS (Istituto per la vigilanza sulle assicurazioni) and internal agents, such as the board 
of statutory auditors, the surveillance council and the management control committee. 
 
In China, one of the departments within the State Council77 organises and coordinates anti-
money laundering activities. The department in charge of anti-money laundering activities, in 
accordance with art. 8 of the Chinese AML law, is also responsible for “monitoring funds in 
connection with anti-money laundering work, [formulating] anti-money laundering rules and 
regulations for financial institutions itself or in concert with the relevant finance regulatory 
organisation of the State Council, [monitoring and inspecting] financial institutions' 
performance of anti-money laundering obligations, [investigating] suspicious transaction 
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activities within its purview and [performing] other anti-money laundering related duties 
specified in laws or by the State Council”. The department, in accordance with art. 10, is also 
responsible for the establishment of the national FIU, whose aim is to analyse STRs and to 
report on its findings to the State Council’s department. Other regulators and enforcement 
bodies are the People’s Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
for the banking industry, the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) for the 
insurance industry, and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) for the 
non-financial sector. 
 
Obligations regarding customer identification 
 
Customer identification is one of the key measures adopted both on an international level and 
on a national level. In this sense, the Italian AML law provides different measures depending 
on the nature of the activities carried out by the subject. For instance, art. 15 deals with 
financial institutions’ obligations in terms of customer identification. Financial institutions are 
required to undertake CDD measures when establishing business relations, carrying out 
occasional transactions above EUR 15,000, when there is suspicion of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, and when the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or 
adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data. Similar procedures and 
thresholds are also applicable to auditors and other professionals. These obligations, in 
accordance with art. 18, consist of several activities, including the identification and 
verification of the customer’s identity and obtaining information on the purpose and nature of 
the business relation, which shall be preserved for a minimum of ten years after the 
conclusion of the business relation. 
 
The Chinese AML law, in a similar fashion to the Italian AML law, requires financial 
institutions to establish a system for authenticating the identities of customers.  Customer due 
diligence, in accordance with art. 16, is required when establishing business relations and 
when carrying out occasional transactions above a specified threshold. Furthermore, art. 16 
specifies that “if a financial institution has suspicions as to the truthfulness, validity or 
completeness of the identity information previously obtained from a customer, it shall 
authenticate such customer's identity anew”. Customer identities and transaction records shall 
be preserved for a minimum of five years after the conclusion of the business relation. As of 
January 201678, CDD measures are not required neither for one-off services (i.e. cash 
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remittance, cash exchange and negotiable instruments cashing) below USD 1,000 or 
equivalent nor for property insurance contracts paid in cash below USD 1,000. Large Value 
Transactions (LVTs), however, must be reported. In this case, the threshold is set at 
approximately USD 10,000 for daily cash transactions and at approximately USD 100,000 for 
wire transfers; for entities other than individuals, the threshold is set at approximately USD 
200,000. 
 
Legal liability 
 
Both the Italian and the Chinese AML laws provide for administrative sanctions in case a 
financial institution or other entity fail to perform properly the required CDD measures. Art. 
55 of the Italian law states that any person who fails to perform the customer identification 
process required by the law shall be punished with a fine that ranges from EUR 2,600 to EUR 
13,000. This sanction shall be doubled in case the customer identification process was carried 
out fraudulently. Furthermore, any person who carries out an operation and fails to specify the 
purpose or the nature of the business relation or the professional service, or fake such 
information, shall be imprisoned for a period that ranges from six months to three years and 
shall be punished with a fine that ranges from EUR 5,000 to EUR 50,000. 
 
The sanctions provided for by art. 32 of the Chinese AML law are applicable to financial 
institutions that fail to perform their obligations of authenticating the identity of their 
customers, fail to preserve customer identity information and transaction records, fail to 
submit STRs, conduct transactions with customers whose identity is unknown, violate 
confidentiality provisions, or refuse to collaborate or interfere with an AML investigation. 
Any financial institution that commits any of such acts shall be punished with a fine that 
ranges from RMB 200,000 to RMB 500,000 (approximately from EUR 26,800 to EUR 
67,000). In case a financial institution commits any of the foregoing acts and causes money 
laundering consequences, the fine ranges from RMB 500,000 to RMB 5 million 
(approximately from EUR 67,000 to EUR 670,000) and the directors and other directly 
responsible persons shall be punished with a fine that ranges from RMB 200,000 to RMB 
500,000. 
 
Given the nature and size of the money laundering and terrorist financing phenomena, AML 
legislations need to be constantly up to date. Even though Italy and China are both members 
of the FATF – the former founded and joined the intergovernmental organisation in 1990, 
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while the latter joined the FATF in 2007 – it is clear that the two countries are moving in the 
same direction at two different paces. One of the most frequent criticism about the Chinese 
AML law is that it needs to be revised. According to Yu Guangyuan, vice-president of the 
China Association for Fiscal and Tax Law, the current legislative framework is not adequate 
to deal with many of the new techniques used by money launderers, including mobile 
payments and online banking that, according to Yu, account for nearly 40 per cent of money 
laundering79. On the other hand, Italy, according to the IMF, “has a mature and sophisticated 
AML/CFT regime, with a corresponding well-developed legal and institutional framework”80. 
However, the IMF recognises the high ML/TF risks connected to tax evasion, organised crime 
and corruption, which still represent a significant concern81.  
  
                                                     
79 Cao Yin, “Efforts urged to improve money laundering law,” China Daily, 29 February, 2016, accessed 29 
August, 2016, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-02/29/content_23676602.htm.   
80 IMF, “Italy: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism,” (Washington: IMF, 2016), 7. 
81 Ibid, 21. 
55 
 
Chapter Four 
Empirical analysis of the relationship between criminal 
companies and equity investments in the Piemonte region 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the theoretical concepts illustrated in the previous 
chapters and to provide an analytical framework for the money laundering phenomenon. As 
seen in the second chapter of this dissertation, there are several red flags that characterise 
criminal companies and can be used as quantitative tools for investigations. The empirical 
analysis carried out in this chapter is specifically focused on the use of equity investments by 
criminal companies. These instruments, according to a number of studies (including the report 
issued by Transcrime in 2013) are used by criminal organisations to blur the audit trail of their 
operations and, therefore, facilitate money laundering. 
 
Criminal organisations are a pervasive phenomenon that affects Italy as a whole. The 
diffusion of criminal organisations in the northern regions is not a recent event, contrary to 
common beliefs. According to a former associate of the ‘ndrangheta82, criminal organisations 
have been operating in Piemonte at least since 1972. Nowadays, Piemonte represents one of 
the most important criminal organisation hubs in the North, with an index of presence of 
criminal organisations (indice di presenza mafiosa)83 between 2000 and 2011 equal to 6,11. 
The Liguria region presents the highest level of the index in the North (10,44), while 
Campania presents the highest level in absolute terms (61,21). The Piemonte region has been 
the centre of many investigations that have been carried out throughout the last two decades. 
It is worth noting that the city council of Bardonecchia (TO) was the first city council in the 
northern Italy to be disbanded for association with criminal organisations in 1995. In 2011, 
the so-called “Minotauro” operation led to 142 arrests and the confiscation of assets for a total 
value of about EUR 70 million at the expense of the ‘ndrangheta. In 2012, two city councils 
in the province of Torino (Leinì and Rivarolo Canavese) were disbanded for association with 
criminal organisations. In the light of these considerations, the analysis of data from the 
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Piemonte region may offer interesting insights into the characteristics of criminal 
organisations and their investments in the legal economy. 
 
4.1 Outline of the research and research hypotheses 
 
The first step of the analysis was the collection of data on criminal companies via Telemaco, a 
database that includes data from the various Chambers of Commerce. For the purpose of this 
research, criminal companies are defined as those companies which, in the reference period 
(2005-2014), were managed by persons who in the following years would have been arrested 
for association with criminal organisations. Equity investments are included in the asset 
section of the balance sheet. In particular, art. 2424 of the Italian Civil Code requires 
companies to adopt the following classification: 
 
III - Immobilizzazioni finanziarie, con separata indicazione, per ciascuna voce dei 
crediti, degli importi esigibili entro l'esercizio successivo:  
1) partecipazioni in:  
a) imprese controllate;  
b) imprese collegate;  
c) imprese controllanti;  
d) altre imprese. 
 
In order to carry out the analysis, it was necessary to collect the same data for comparable 
non-criminal companies, which serve as control group. The comparability of criminal and 
non-criminal companies depends on a number of characteristics, such as their size, Ateco 
codes and province where their headquarters are located. The analysis was run on a sample of 
68 criminal companies. However, since the reference period is ten years, and the database 
takes into consideration all the years in which the criminal companies were managed by 
criminals, for several companies there are more than one observation. Specifically, the 
analysis is based on a total of 851 observations: 341 are related to criminal companies, while 
510 are related to the control group. 
 
The final database that was used to carry out the analysis with Stata contains several financial 
information for both the criminal and non-criminal companies, including those related to 
equity investments, such as: 
 Total number of equity investments; 
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 Country in which the subsidiary is located (either in Italy or abroad); 
 Share of ownership; 
 Company name of the subsidiary. 
 
Traditionally, companies have several reasons for holding equity investments. Investments in 
other companies may be used to increase profitability, gain access to a new strategic market 
or resource, gain competitive advantage and achieve many other strategic objectives. As far as 
criminal companies are concerned, equity investments may offer a further advantage, that is 
the possibility to launder the proceeds generated from illicit activities and to issue invoices for 
bogus transactions that are used to transfer the ill-gotten funds. Criminal companies may also 
hold equity investments in foreign companies. In this case, criminal organisations may exploit 
the differences between two or more legislations so as to carry out trade-based money 
laundering activities. Some legislations may also be particularly favourable due to their loose 
CDD measures and low tax rates. 
 
The research questions at the basis of this analysis are therefore the following: do criminal 
companies hold more equity investments, either in Italy or abroad, than comparable non-
criminal companies? Is their average percentage of ownership higher or lower? What are the 
common elements, if any, of such equity investments? 
The classification of criminal and non-criminal companies is made through the use of a 
dichotomous variable that is equal to zero when the company is classified as non-criminal and 
equal to one when the company is classified as criminal. 
 
4.2 Criminal companies and Ateco codes 
 
The sample of criminal companies that was used to carry out the research consists of 68 
unique companies observed for ten years, for a total of 341 observations. In the following 
pages, the sampled companies are presented on the basis of a number of accounting 
information, namely total assets, leverage and availability of cash. 
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  Percentiles Smallest 
  
  
1% 10,199 3,549 
  
  
5% 41,638 9,373 
  
  
10% 105,187 10,000 
 
Obs 341 
25% 274,606 10,199 
 
Sum of Wgt. 341 
      
  
  
50% 942,721   
 
Mean 7,175,403 
    Largest 
 
Std. Dev. 58,295,160 
75% 3,165,057 21,866,580 
  
  
90% 7,955,773 32,534,450 
 
Variance 3.40e+09 
95% 11,998,310 74,084,570 
 
Skewness 12.84954 
99% 21,866,580 78,430,870   Kurtosis 167.1709 
Table 1 (Criminal companies: Total Assets in thousands of euros) 
 
The values of the Total Assets variable shown in Table 1 present a high level of variability 
within the sample. The high values of both skewness and kurtosis imply that the distribution 
is far from symmetrical. This is also evident from the difference between the median (EUR 
942,721) and the mean (EUR 7,175,403). In order to perform a proper analysis, the presence 
of one or more outliers must be taken into account. 
 
  Percentiles Smallest 
  
  
1% 0.031 0.000 
  
  
5% 0.154 0.005 
  
  
10% 0.374 0.015 
 
Obs 341 
25% 0.682 0.031 
 
Sum of Wgt. 341 
      
  
  
50% 0.888   
 
Mean 0.843 
    Largest 
 
Std. Dev. 0.470 
75% 0.945 3.266 
  
  
90% 1.017 3.352 
 
Variance 0.211 
95% 1.197 4.112 
 
Skewness 3.407 
99% 3.266 4.347   Kurtosis 24.623 
Table 2 (Criminal companies: Leverage) 
 
The distribution of values for the Leverage variable shown in Table 2 are much more 
symmetrical than the distribution of values for the Total assets variable: the median and the 
mean are closer, while the skewness is still positive but closer to zero.  
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  Percentiles Smallest 
  
  
1% -164,424 -261,732 
  
  
5% 34 -186,091 
  
  
10% 280 -179,130 
 
Obs 341 
25% 2,657 -164,424 
 
Sum of Wgt. 341 
      
  
  
50% 21,767   
 
Mean 3,786,732 
    Largest 
 
Std. Dev. 45,706,960 
75% 191,203 5,847,839 
  
  
90% 954,779 6,958,240 
 
Variance 2.09e+09 
95% 1,460,285 568,577,500 
 
Skewness 12.983 
99% 5,847,839 625,859,100   Kurtosis 169.985 
Table 3 (Criminal companies: Availability of cash in thousands of euros) 
 
The values of the Availability of cash variable shown in Table 3 follow the distribution of the 
Total assets variable, which is in line with the original expectations. The mean value (EUR 
3,786,732) is remarkably higher than the median value (EUR 21,767), while the skewness and 
kurtosis have similar values to those seen for the Total assets variable. Furthermore, even the 
four largest values of the variable are significantly different, since the highest of the four 
values is more than 100 times higher the lowest of the four values. The highest values belong 
to the observations related to one specific company over a period of two years and must be 
taken into account in the analysis. 
 
As already seen in the second chapter of this dissertation, criminal organisations prefer to 
invest in certain industries rather than in others. Criminal organisations invest in the legal 
economy with the aim of creating social consensus, obtaining control over a specific 
territories and laundering money. Specifically, the 68 sampled criminal companies operate in 
23 different business sectors. Table 4 sums up the distribution of such business sectors. 
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Ateco code  Business sector Frequency Percentage 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
4 1.17 
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products, except machinery and 
equipment 
3 0.88 
28 Manufacture of machinery and 
equipment 
14 4.11 
36 Water collection, treatment and supply 4 1.17 
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal 
activities; materials recovery 
8 2.35 
41 Construction of building 122 35.78 
42 Civil engineering 6 1.76 
43 Specialised construction activities  26 7.62 
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles  
11 3.23 
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
10 2.93 
49 Land transport and transport via 
pipelines 
7 2.05 
58 Publishing activities 2 0.59 
64 Financial service activities, except 
insurance and pension funding 
7 2.05 
68 Real estate activities 54 15.84 
70 Activities of head offices; management 
consultancy activities 
11 3.23 
71 Architectural and engineering activities; 
technical testing and analysis 
8 2.35 
78 Employment activities 7 2.05 
80 Security and investigation activities 2 0.59 
82 Office administrative, office support and 
other business support activities 
8 2.35 
85 Education  19 5.57 
87 Residential care activities  5 1.47 
93 Sports activities and amusement and 
recreation activities  
1 0.29 
96 Other personal service activities  2 0.59 
  Total 341 100.00 
Table 4 (Criminal companies: business sectors) 
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Graph 1 (Criminal companies: business sectors) 
 
As shown both in Table 4 and in Graph 1, the construction industry is the business sector with 
the highest frequency and accounts for more than one-third of the observations. This industry 
presents several characteristics that may be attractive to criminal organisations, such as the 
high availability of public funds, limited degree of competition and low productivity of 
labour. This result is in line with the study performed by Transcrime in 2013. Another 
business sector that presents a high frequency is the real estate industry, which accounts for 
more than 15% of the observations. This sector was the subject of a report of the FATF that 
was published in 2007 and that was illustrated in the first chapter of this dissertation.  
 
4.3 Preliminary considerations on the equity investment variables 
 
In order to understand if it is worth deepening the research activities, it may be useful to 
perform a preliminary analysis of a few basic statistics on the number of equity investments 
held by both criminal companies and non-criminal companies. These statistics include the 
mean values, the standard deviation and both the minimum and maximum amounts observed 
in the samples. It is worth noting that the number of observations in the following table may 
be lower, due to the limited availability of data. 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Non-criminal 453 0.523 1.180 
Criminal 323 1.254 5.008 
Table 5 (Total number of equity investments) 
 
Table 5 shows that criminal companies hold on average a higher number of equity 
investments. However, the variability within the sample of criminal companies is much 
higher, due to the presence of two observations related to a particularly big company. In order 
to confirm that these results are not solely due to the presence of outliers, it is useful to 
winsorise the variable for 1%. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Non-criminal 453 0.523 1.180 
Criminal 323 0.978 2.701 
Table 6 (Total number of equity investments after winsorisation) 
 
Table 6 shows that the results of the preliminary analysis hold true even when the extreme 
values are not considered. In this case, the mean value of total equity investments held by 
criminal companies (0.98) is almost twice the mean value obtained for non-criminal 
companies (0.52). 
The same preliminary research may be performed also on the equity investments held abroad 
by criminal and non-criminal companies, so as to see whether it is worth deepening the 
analysis of this hypothesis. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Non-criminal 459 0.041 0.331 
Criminal 323 0.090 0.440 
Table 7 (Total number of equity investments abroad) 
 
The results shown in Table 7 confirm the research hypothesis on equity investments abroad. 
Criminal companies, on average, hold twice as much equity investments than comparable 
non-criminal companies. Even though the results do not appear to be affected by the presence 
of outliers, for the sake of consistency the variable was winsorised for 1% (results are shown 
in Table 8). 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Non-criminal 459 0.041 0.331 
Criminal 323 0.090 0.440 
Table 8 (Total number of equity investments abroad after winsorisation) 
 
Finally, the same preliminary research may be performed on the average percentage of 
ownership held by the two groups of companies. Assuming that criminal companies use 
equity investments in other firms to launder money, it is worth measuring whether their 
average share is higher than the average share held by comparable non-criminal companies. In 
this case, the results for the winsorised variable are shown in the following table. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Non-criminal 388 0.062 0.198 
Criminal 288 0.096 0.233 
Table 9 (Average percentage of ownership after winsorisation) 
 
Table 9 shows that criminal companies, on average, hold a higher share of ownership with 
respect to comparable non-criminal companies. As regards the sample size for this variable, 
the number of observations has decreased because of the lack or insufficiency of data within 
the companies’ financial statements.  
Although these tables confirm that the sampled criminal companies, on average, have a higher 
number of equity investments – either in Italy or abroad – and that their average share of 
ownership is higher with respect to comparable non-criminal companies, the results are far 
from statistically significant. The purpose of the preliminary research performed so far is to 
confirm that it is worth deepening the analysis of data with more precise tests. A common tool 
to perform this kind of analysis is the t-test. The t-test has several applications, but for the 
purpose of this analysis it can provide further information on the significance of the mean 
values obtained in the preliminary stage of the research. In particular, it can be used to test the 
null hypothesis such that the means of two populations are equal. In this case, the null 
hypothesis is that the mean values of a specific winsorised variable – Total equity 
investments, Total equity investments abroad or Average percentage of ownership – are equal 
for both criminal companies and non-criminal companies. 
 
The first t-test is performed on the winsorized Total equity investments variable, whose 
results are shown in Table 10. 
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Criminal Obs Mean Std. Err. 
0 453 0.523 0.554 
1 323 0.973 0.150 
  776     
t = -3.186   
Pr(|T| >|t|) = 0.002   
Table 10 (t-test for the winsorized Total equity investments variable) 
 
Table 10 shows that the results obtained in the preliminary analysis of the Total equity 
investments variable are significant, even after the winsorisation of the variable, as the p-
value is equal to 0.0015. Therefore, it is possible to reject the null hypothesis with a 5% 
significance level and conclude that criminal companies, on average, hold more equity 
investments than comparable non-criminal companies. However, these results need to be 
further analysed, as the number of equity investments held by a company presumably does 
not depend only on the variable considered. 
 
Criminal Obs Mean Std. Err. 
0 459 0.041 0.016 
1 323 0.090 0.025 
  782     
t = -1.754   
Pr(|T| >|t|) = 0.080   
Table 11 (t-test for the winsorized Total equity investments abroad variable) 
 
The results shown in Table 11 for the Total equity investments abroad variable are not as in 
line with the research hypothesis as the results for the Total equity investments variable. The 
p-value of the test performed on the Total equity investments abroad variable is higher than 
0.05, albeit still lower than 0.1. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis at the 
5% level, but it is possible to reject it at the 10% level. Although the results are not 
convincing, the variable may still be analysed at a deeper level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Criminal Obs Mean Std. Err. 
0 388 0.062 0.010 
1 288 0.096 0.014 
  676     
t = -2.035   
Pr(|T| >|t|) = 0.042   
Table 12 (t-test for the winsorized Average percentage of ownership variable) 
 
Table 12 shows that the results for the Average percentage of ownership variable are 
significantly in line with the initial research hypothesis. The p-value of the test is lower than 
0.05 and therefore it is possible to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level. However, further 
analyses are required in order to understand whether these results are really due to the 
independent variable, that is the dichotomous Criminal variable. 
 
4.4 Description of the model 
 
The results obtained in the last section take into consideration only the relation between the 
independent dichotomous Criminal variable and the dependent equity investment variables. 
These considerations are useful to obtain a general idea on whether the relation between the 
two variables is in line with the research hypothesis, but they are not enough to draw a 
conclusion on the effect of the independent variable on the dependent one. The t-test may give 
useful information on the correlation between the variables, but does not give any information 
on the causal effect. It follows that it is necessary to develop a model that takes into account 
other factors that may have an impact on the values taken either by the dependent variable or 
the independent variables. The control variables that are used in the multivariate regression 
model that follows this section are described in Table 13. 
 
  Obs Mean SD p25 p50 p75 
Size_w 851 6.640 1.579 5.364 6.690 7.730 
ROE_w 851 0.070 1.074 -6.638 0.043 0.221 
Leverage_w 851 0.799 0.501 0.607 0.849 0.947 
Table 13 (Control variables) 
 
These control variables are expected to have an impact on the dependent equity investment 
variables and, for the sake of consistency, they are all winsorised for 1%.  In particular: 
 The variable that takes into account companies’ size corresponds to the logarithm of 
their total assets. Size is expected to influence the value of the equity investment 
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variables because bigger companies are more willing to invest in other companies. 
The purpose of taking the logarithm is to deal with a symmetrical distribution that 
would otherwise be impossible to obtain, given the high skewness of the Total Assets 
variable shown in Table 1.  
 The ROE (Return on Equity), calculated as net income over equity, is a ratio 
commonly used to measure the profitability of a company. This ratio is used as a 
control variable because the profitability of a firm is expected to be positively 
correlated with its willingness to invest in other companies. 
 The leverage, calculated as total liabilities over total assets, is a measure of the level of 
indebtedness of a company, that is how much the company finance its operations 
through the use of debts. Given the relation between profitability and leverage – the 
DuPont Analysis shows that the financial leverage is one of the driver of the ROE – it 
is necessary to use this variable as a control variable. 
 
In order to understand the strength and direction of the relationship between the variables, it is 
possible to use a correlation matrix. The results84 that are significant at the 5% level are 
shown in Table 14 and are marked with a star if they are significant also at the 1% level. 
 
  Criminal 
Total Eq. 
Inv._w 
Total Eq. 
Inv. 
abroad_w 
Avg. 
ownership_w 
Size_w Leverage_w ROE_w 
Criminal 1             
Total Eq. Inv._w 0.114* 1           
Total Eq. Inv 
abroad_w 
  0.553* 1         
Avg. 
ownership_w 
0.078 0.573* 0.575* 1       
Size_w 0.093* 0.313* 0.193* 0.350* 1     
Leverage_w 0.071 -0.086 -0.131* 0.118 -0.073 1   
ROE_w           0.095* 1 
Table 14 (Correlation matrix) 
 
 The Criminal variable is significantly and positively correlated with both the Total 
equity investments variable and the Average percentage of ownership variable, but it 
is not significantly correlated with the Total equity investments abroad variable, at 
least at the 5% level. These results are in line with the results obtained with the t-tests. 
                                                     
84 The results shown in the correlation matrix refer to winsorised variables. 
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Furthermore, the Criminal variable is positively and significantly correlated with the 
Size variable. 
 As regards the Total equity investments variable, the correlation matrix shows that this 
variable is positively and significantly correlated with the Total equity investments 
abroad variable, the Average ownership variable and the Size variable. It follows that 
larger companies are more likely to hold large equity investments, either in Italy or 
abroad. 
 The Total equity investments abroad variable is negatively and significantly correlated 
with the Leverage variable. Therefore, companies with lower level of indebtedness are 
expected to hold more equity investments abroad than companies with a higher 
leverage. As seen in the second chapter of this dissertation, criminal companies may 
have lower level of indebtedness because of their large availability of cash, and at the 
same time may hold a higher level of equity investments in foreign companies for 
carrying out international trade-based money laundering. 
 
4.5 Multivariate regression 
 
The general purpose of a multivariate regression model is to obtain a clearer insight about the 
relationship between a number of independent variables and a dependent variable. Even 
though the results of the t-tests represent a good starting point for the analysis of the 
relationship between the Criminal variable and the equity investment variables, it is necessary 
to develop a statistical model that takes into account also the other variables that have an 
impact on the dependent variable. The multivariate regression is performed on the three 
winsorized dependent equity investment variables that are at the basis of this research: Total 
equity investments, Total equity investments abroad and Average percentage of ownership. 
 
Multivariate regression on the Total equity investments variable 
 
The first multivariate regression is performed on the winsorized Total equity investments 
variable. Since the distribution of the dependent variable is left-censored, with many 
observations taking zero as value, it may be necessary to perform a tobit regression, also 
known as a censored regression model. In particular, the analysis is performed setting the 
lower limit equal to zero and therefore the values that fall at this threshold are censored. The 
results of the analysis are shown in Table 15.  
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Variable 
(1) 
Tot. Eq. Inv. 
(2) 
Tot. Eq. Inv. 
Criminal 
0.031 0.031 
(0.428) (0.911) 
Size_w 
1.536*** 1.536*** 
(0.213) (0.460) 
Lev_w 
-0.603 -0.603 
(0.625) (0.931) 
ROE_w 
-0.105 -0.105 
(0.178) (0.191) 
Constant 
-12.311*** -12.311*** 
(2.353) (3.947) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Robust option Yes Yes 
Cluster option No Yes 
Observations 776 776 
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.077 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 15 (Tobit regression on the Total equity investments variable) 
 
In the first column, the tobit regression is performed using the robust option. The results show 
that the dichotomous Criminal variable is not useful in explaining changes in the dependent 
variable. In the second column, the tobit regression is performed using the cluster option. 
Given that the model uses observations that are clustered into companies (identified by their 
Codice Fiscale - CF), it is necessary to perform the multivariate regression using the cluster 
option, that takes into account that observations may be correlated within companies. It is 
worth noting that the robust option is implied with the cluster option. The results obtained 
using the cluster option, which adjusted the standard errors for 163 clusters in CF, are still not 
significant. It follows that it is not possible to determine, on the basis of this model, whether 
criminal companies hold more equity investments than non-criminal companies.  
 
Multivariate regression on the Total equity investments abroad variable 
 
The second multivariate regression is performed on the winsorized Total equity investments 
abroad variable. Since also in this case the distribution of the dependent variable is left-
censored, it is necessary to perform a tobit regression. The results of the analysis are shown in 
Table 16. 
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Variable 
(1) 
Tot. Eq. Inv. 
abroad 
(2) 
Tot. Eq. Inv. 
abroad 
Criminal 
2.975*** 2.975* 
(0.797) (1.786) 
Size_w 
1.350*** 1.350*** 
(0.202) (0.308) 
Lev_w 
-8.895*** -8.895*** 
(1.269) (1.877) 
ROE_w 
1.139*** 1.139** 
(0.378) (0.499) 
Constant 
-9.281*** -9.281*** 
(2.375) (2.569) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Robust option Yes Yes 
Cluster option No Yes 
Observations 782 782 
Pseudo R2 0.286 0.286 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 16 (Tobit regression on the Total equity investments abroad variable) 
 
In the first column, the tobit regression is performed using the robust option. The results show 
that the dichotomous Criminal variable is significant at the 1% level and, therefore, is useful 
in explaining changes in the dependent variable. In the second column, the tobit regression is 
performed using the cluster option, adjusting for 163 clusters. Also in this case, the 
dichotomous Criminal variable is significant, albeit at the 10% level. These results are in line 
with the research hypothesis that criminal companies hold, on average, more equity 
investments in foreign companies than non-criminal companies. 
 
Multivariate regression on the Average percentage of ownership variable 
 
Finally, the last multivariate regression is performed on the winsorized Average percentage of 
ownership variable. Since in this case the distribution of the variable does not require a tobit 
regression, it is possible to use the standard OLS model, first with the robust option and then 
with the cluster option, adjusting for 153 clusters. The results of the analysis are shown in 
Table 17. 
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Variable 
(1) 
Avg. 
Ownership 
(2) 
Avg. 
Ownership 
Criminal 
0.030* 0.030 
(0.016) (0.031) 
Size_w 
0.046*** 0.046*** 
(0.006) (0.011) 
Lev_w 
-0.043*** -0.043 
(0.014) (0.026) 
ROE_w 
-0.002 -0.002 
(0.005) (0.006) 
Constant 
-0.203*** -0.203*** 
(0.043) (0.056) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Robust option Yes Yes 
Cluster option No Yes 
Observations 676 676 
R-squared 0.143 0.143 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Table 17 (Linear regression on the Average percentage of ownership variable) 
 
In the first column, the linear regression is performed using the robust option. The results 
show that the dichotomous Criminal variable is significant at the 10% level and, therefore, is 
useful in explaining changes in the dependent variable. However, these results are no longer 
significant after the introduction of the cluster option, whose results are shown in the second 
column. It follows that it is not possible, on the basis of this model, to draw any accurate 
conclusion on whether Criminal companies have larger equity investments than non-criminal 
companies. 
 
4.6 Overview of the analysis and final considerations 
 
The purpose of the research illustrated in this chapter is to explain whether criminal 
companies use more equity investments, either in Italy or abroad, than comparable non-
criminal companies, and whether such equity investments are on average larger than those 
held by non-criminal companies, in terms of percentage of ownership. As regards the equity 
investments held by criminal companies in Italian companies, the results obtained from the 
tobit regression are in line with the research hypothesis, but there is not enough statistical 
support to draw any significant conclusion. Similar results were also obtained from the linear 
regression on the Average percentage of ownership variable. On the other hand, the tobit 
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regression on the Total equity investments abroad variable provides interesting information. 
The results of the tobit model with the robust option are statistically significant at the 1% 
level, which implies that the dichotomous Criminal variable does have an influence on the 
dependent variable. The significance of these results is reduced by the use of the cluster 
option, which is a much stricter rule than the robust option. Nonetheless, the results are still 
significant at the 10% level.  
 
The results obtained from the tobit regression on the Total equity investments abroad variable 
represent also an interesting starting point for some qualitative considerations. The analysis of 
the equity investments in foreign firms held by criminal companies may provide useful 
insights on which are the countries where criminal organisations conceal their ill-gotten 
funds. In particular, with respect to the sample of criminal companies analysed throughout 
this research, there are a number of information that are worth considering. First, the majority 
of the criminal companies that held equity investments in foreign countries were based in 
Torino and operated in one of the three following business sectors: financial service activities, 
except insurance and pension funding, real estate activities, and activities of head offices and 
management consultancy activities. Second, the aforementioned companies were all 
confiscated in 2011 during the so-called operation “Minotauro”. This operation led to 142 
arrests and the confiscation of companies, villas and apartments, vehicles and bank accounts 
for a total value of about EUR 70 million at the expense of the ‘ndrangheta¸ which is the 
major criminal organisation operating in the Piemonte region. Finally, the equity investments 
in foreign firms held by the aforementioned criminal companies were limited to only five 
different countries: Argentina, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Albania.  
In the light of these considerations, the importance of further researches in this field is clear: 
the combination of quantitative data and qualitative information may represent a turning point 
in the fight against criminal organisations and money laundering. In particular, the statistical 
analysis of equity investments in foreign firms held by criminal companies may play a major 
role in the identification of the money trails that need to be followed so as to stop the 
international trade-based money laundering phenomenon.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Money laundering is a pervasive phenomenon that affects every economic system, from the 
richest countries to the poorest. The necessity of cleaning the proceeds originated from illicit 
activities is common to every criminal organisation in the world. While it is not possible to 
measure the actual size of the phenomenon, it is still possible to estimate it. In 2009, 
according to the key findings of the UNODC, the size of global money laundering was around 
2.7 per cent of global GDP, with an “interception rate” as low as 0.2 per cent. It follows that a 
lot remains to be done in terms of AML legislation and investigations. In fact, money 
laundering methods and techniques are constantly evolving and adapting to the AML 
legislative framework. Criminal organisations employ cash couriers and smugglers, front 
businesses and professionals for their money laundering activities, with operations that range 
from complex international transactions to gambling. 
 
Criminal organisations employ front businesses also for other purposes. On the one hand, 
criminal organisations may invest in the legal economy with the aim of exploiting their power 
and financial resources to increase their competitive advantage and, as a consequence, their 
profitability. On the other hand, criminal companies represent a fundamental instrument for 
increasing social consensus and controlling territories. Among the tools that criminal 
organisations may exploit to increase the profitability of their companies there are the 
discouragement of competitors, the reduction of labour costs and the huge availability of 
funds. In this sense, it is worth mentioning that the research carried out by Transcrime in 2013 
showed that the profitability of criminal companies is often significantly lower than the 
profitability of their legitimate competitors, despite their unique sources of competitive 
advantage. Furthermore, criminal companies, depending on whether they are aimed at 
maximising profitability or supporting the operations of other companies, may present a 
number of features in their financial statements that investigators shall consider throughout 
their investigations. These red flags include the availability of funds, the level of indebtedness 
and their equity investments. This last financial item is the subject of the research carried out 
in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
 
Money laundering and the financing of terrorism are linked by the need of secrecy. The 
techniques that are used to launder money are similar to, if not the same as, those used to 
conceal the sources of terrorist financing. It follows that an exhaustive international 
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legislative framework aimed at fighting one of the two phenomena cannot fail to deal with the 
other. International initiatives include the Palermo Convention, the Terrorist Financing 
Convention and the Recommendations of the FATF, which countries are encouraged to 
implement. However, national AML/CFT legislative frameworks are far from homogeneous. 
For instance, although Italy and China are both members of the FATF – the former founded 
and joined the intergovernmental organisation in 1990, while the latter joined the FATF in 
2007 – it is clear that the two countries are moving in the same direction at two different 
paces. 
 
The last chapter of this dissertation consists in a research on the use of equity investments by 
criminal companies. For the purpose of the research, criminal companies are defined as those 
companies which, from 2005 to 2014, were managed by persons who in the following years 
would have been arrested for association with criminal organisations. The analysis is carried 
out on a sample of 68 criminal companies that were located in the Piemonte region. Criminal 
organisations have been operating in Piemonte at least since 1972 and, nowadays, this region 
represents one of the most important criminal organisation hubs in the North. The research 
questions at the basis of this analysis are therefore the following: do criminal companies hold 
more equity investments, either in Italy or abroad, than comparable non-criminal companies? 
Is their average percentage of ownership higher or lower? What are the common elements, if 
any, of such equity investments? 
As regards the equity investments in Italian companies and the average percentage of 
ownership, the results obtained from the analysis are in line with the research hypotheses, but 
there is not enough statistical support to draw any significant conclusion. On the other hand, 
the results obtained from the tobit regression on the equity investments in foreign companies 
provide interesting information. The results of the tobit model with the robust option are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, which implies that the dichotomous Criminal variable 
does have an influence on the dependent variable. These results are confirmed at the 10% 
level also with the cluster option. Further studies may use these results as a starting point and 
extend the research to other regions, in order to perform an analysis on a larger number of 
criminal companies that hold equity investments in foreign companies. These results are also 
a valid starting point for some qualitative considerations. The majority of the criminal 
companies that held equity investments in foreign companies were located in Torino and were 
confiscated during the same investigative operation. Furthermore, their investments were 
limited to only five different countries: Argentina, Germany, France, United Kingdom and 
Albania. It follows that the combination of quantitative data and qualitative information may 
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represent a turning point in the fight against criminal organisations and money laundering. 
The study of this information may lead to the identification of the money trails that need to be 
followed so as to stop the international trade-based money laundering phenomenon. 
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